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2.2.8 Related Data Analysis
Here in this short subsection, a short coverage will be given of the approaches / avenues /
aspects to data gathering as utilized by the philosophers being examined. Their data approaches are
inspected in relation to the study problem in hand.
Table 2.2.8./1 highlights some of the problematics concerning rational choice and action that
philosophers inquire into. A number of important points are in evidence within it!
Philosophy used to be seen as the longstanding disciplinary protector of mankind’s "‘emphatic
concepts of truth’, the ideas of reason, freedom, goodness and justice" (McCarthy 1978:105). But
philosophers nowadays are less committed to the task of themapping of the absolute. Conceptualizations
about or of truth are no longer axiomatically tied to an idea of certainty. Truth is more commonly
reckoned to be social, situational and / or contextual.
Hence philosophers have begun to recognize that there ought to be no substantive or conceptual
gulf between a ‘proud’ or ‘privileged’ philosophy and other more ‘mundane’ fields of inquiry. It is not
sensible to slice understanding up into pockets of contained knowledge. Philosophy has been found to
be just as much a matter of culture, social relations and politics as it is about certainty. And philosophy’s
heartache over certainty, has forced the admission that "epistemology is not a closed and aphoristic
discipline floating above the sciences. It is rather itself a realm of scientific knowledge, a field in which
all other sciences may legitimately interfere" (Albert 1987:82). Only limited sorts of understanding are
possible then, when "natural history becomes [merely] biology, when the analysis of wealth becomes
[only] economics" (Foucault 1970:312), or when only philosophy in isolation is supposed to ponder ‘truth’
and ‘rationality’. Reduced explanations constrain: interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary explanations,
though, tend to enrich the perspective.
One problem that is encountered in learning from philosophy is that the data gathering
techniques favored in philosophy are largely neither objective nor verifiable. Researchers in other fields
must be fully grounded in ‘alternative’ / ‘non-positivist’ forms of understanding to take large benefit from
philosophical insight. The theses of philosophy "can neither have nor act as guarantees" (Macdonell
1986:78) in the kinds of ‘sure’ forms of ‘knowledge’ that many academicians only ever do or want to deal
with. Philosophy cannot offer the safety net of nullity, and since it no longer pretends to deal in absolute
truths, it cannot claim to offer the benefit of a neutral knowledge (80).
Philosophical insight tends not to be, then, readily-packaged intelligence: it is no takeaway
judgement’ for easy application. As Althusser (1976:58) discloses, philosophy lends assistance to
problem-solvers in other ways, "by modifying the position of the problems". Consonantly, the value
of the insight from philosophical data is that it helps orientate the investigator to new and pertinent
discourse, to unsuspected methods of analysis and to the existence of auxiliary ‘foreign’ perspectives.
In generally exploring questions of truth and rationality — or, as in this instance, in specifically
inquiry into truths of dominance and subjugation in cultural production — researchers may frequently be
found condemning philosophy’s lack of testability. Indeed, even Habermas (1973:6-7) bemoans the
TABLE2.2.8./1
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absence of sufficiently precise hypotheses to solve issues of legitimacy and domination. But all of that
tends to ignore the functional value of philosophy. Philosophy's merit is that it opens up proprioception
to the truth — that is, to the possibilities of different truths. Its value is that it teaches (or can teach!)
researchers to be much more suspect about the technical value of their methods and the nested
significances of their data gathering techniques. As Alexandre Koyre pointedly expressed it, the
technical goodness of a theory — i.e., its explanatory power — is not always the or an open
sesame to scientific understanding (see Zambelli in Koyre 1967:37ff).
Those who may doubt the value of Koyre’s insight may prefer to stay with data from the 'normal'
philosophy of the English speaking world. Anglo-Saxon philosophy has tended to be academic in style
and analytic in method (Merquior 1985:11). But other avenues to understanding are possible, and French
litero-philosophy in particular, supplies them through the theses of Bergson, of Satre, of Bachelard, of
Derrida, of Barthes, of Foucault and of others (11-13). Their philosophical work may be, individually and
collectively, "wantonly free of [traditional positivist] analytic discipline" (12) — but they have each taken
us to vast new provinces of intellect and wisdom. Their mixed genre philosophies have given (to all social
and human fields of inquiry) what is fundamentally needed: more ‘sawy’. They have constructed richer
veins of cognition about what truth, meaning and action are and can be.
2.2.9 Cross-Evaluation with Postmodernity
One could argue that postmodernity began with the philosophy of Nietzsche. One could state
that with the humanism of Nietzsche, modernity "loses its singular status" (Habermas 1987:87).
Philosophers, thinkers, social scientists begin to recognize that enlightenment is not ‘right’ and that the
modern age is not necessarily ‘better'. With Nietzsche the philosophical foundations of entelechy are
undercut, and the progressivist merit of the 'advanced' age of mankind is called to question.
With Nietzsche, modernity is not triumphalized as a glorious techno-scientific age where its
people are suddenly able to free themselves from the strictures of religion, it is instead shown up to be
a sadly and growingly mythless age for humanity. To Nietzsche, the ascendancy of reason plainly
afforded further progress in technical matters, but yielded much diremption in the quality of human
existence. The dialectic of enlightenment had to be abandoned: it was principally creating a world of
distortions. Enlightenment reason and modernist will-to-power were drawing up their own meanings, and
inventing their own universal ways of knowing and acting morally (95). Life was slowly being masked,
and made simple and superficial, geared incidentally and predominantly to suit the interests of those
'wielding' technicist logic whether or not they were aware of the will-to-illusion that they utilize to propel
their rationalities. The essential problem that Nietzsche uncovered was that the new, powerful modernist
critique of reason was setting itself up "outside the horizon of reason" (96).
So, in unmasking the corruptions and falsifications of modernity’s will-to-power, the philosophy
of Nietzsche gave impetus to the challenge against subject-centered reason, and ultimately encouraged
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a liberality of thinking on reason, truth and life through his free-spirited successors such as Bataille, Lacan
and Foucault (97).
The resultant interface between philosophy and postmodernity is no neat and orderly beach¬
head, however. For some social-philosophers, postmodernity is — as was identified in subsection 1.2-
- an age of historical amnesia. It is, by such accounts, an age in which people and institutions have lost
their sense of history, and — living in a perpetual present — they live by their own realities and
rationalities (Jameson 1985:125). The logics and interpretations of the past are seen to be resisted much
more commonly than ever before.
Other social-philosophers take a rather different stand on the nature of the reason that drives
postmodernity. They, instead, would prefer to see postmodernity as a set of social, cultural and other
forces which replicate — at an untrammelled velocity --- the logic of consumer capitalism (125). By this
regard, postmodernity reproduces many of the key circumstances by which modernist reasoning can
continue to succeed. Consequently, with a phenomenon as complex as postmodernity, philosophers have
to be most discerning in what they accept or reject. They must put close scrutiny into what Dewey
deemed to be ‘the meaning of the daily detail’ of fellow theorists.
To that end, the philosophical writings of Foucault and Habermas will now be briefly critiqued in
relation to postmodernity.
Foucault, of course, was adamant that he was not a postmodernist, whatever one was. He saw
himself as a scientist of discourse and a student of power — or rather of the Nietzschean fusion of
reason and power. But Foucault did not see himself as a structuralist theoretician, nor indeed as any
sort of theoretician. Foucault claimed merely to be a commentator on the plurality of power strategies that
exist (and have existed) amongst people, within institutions and in life. He claimed to be a critic of history
(i.e., past ages) rather than an analyst of postmodemity, ipso facto, (i.e., the contemporary age).
But Foucault’s philosophical oeuvre is so frequently applied by others to the postmodern debate.
Foucault (1988:103) had asked historically: who had power over whom, when and by what reason and
instrument. Postmodern thinkers now tend to ask similar questions, and like Foucault, tend to uncover
power systems (acting in and through Western society) which do not coincide with each other, but which
do interfeed. In this respect Foucault’s (1980:72) studies of dominance are notMarxist; neither, then, are
those of succeeding postmodern theorists who take a similarly plural view of power.
If Foucault is not necessarily a postmodernist, it may be easier to describe him as an
antimodernist. Foucault did not identify with one supreme or universal truth, he saw many different
truths emerge through civilization, through the peculiar and irregular connections of discourse to practice.
To him the modernist consciousness of time was much too presentist (Habermas [on Foucault]
1987:249). Modernist understanding was too heavily anthropocentric (261) based overly on self-
thematized knowledge (261). He saw modernist scientists as being utopian in their vision, but enslaved
by their own self-reflected concepts of liberations (264), and trapped within their own theoretical language
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games (282-3). Thus, if Foucault is not a postmodernist thinker, he conceivably is a dissident
philosopher who resists the disciplinary and the disciplining power of modernist thought.
Habermas can never be so steadfastly positioned againstmodernity. To Habermas, modernity
does have redeeming value (Seidman 1989:2): his philosophical analyses find an emancipatory potential
within the rationality of modernity — modernity does reasonably offer an utopian potential (Habermas
1981; 1987). Thus Habermas targets his suspicious against the crippling reasoning of the Enlightenment,
but endorses modernity itself as an age with significant accomplishments in the expansion of legal
sensitivity, in the spread of democratic principles and in the empowerment of cultural pluralism (Seidman
1989:6). His philosophy speaks not so much towards a Nietzschean counter-reckoning against
modernity, but to a counter-discourse within a new extension of the emancipatory elements of modernity
(McCarthy 1987:xv).
The philosophy of Habermas runs at odds with that of the anti-modernist or post-modern
followers of Nietzsche. Habermas could not accept the complete incredulity towards metanarratives
that staunch postmodernists demanded. To him the constant unmasking of metanarratives only is
worthwhile if society is able "to preserve at least one standard for [the] explanation of the corruption of
all reasonable standards" (Habermas 1982/B:28). Such statements show that Habermas was keen to
retain an universalistic philosophy. To him, universalism can support liberal politics despite its difficulties
conceptualizing reality (Rorty 1985:162). And progress ought to be sought by liberal thinkers and activists
by finding the merit in modernist forces and in apparently oppositional institutions, not by avoiding them:
"social purposes are served ... by finding beautiful ways of harmonizing interests, rather than sublime
ways of detaching oneself from others’ interests" (174).
By Habermas’s judgement, liberal or postmodern philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze and
Lyotard were themselves merely neo-conservative, and were unable to offer a theoretical basis for
mobilizing society in one way rather than any other (Bernstein 1985:30). Foucault’s reasoning was
adjudged by him to be unconnected with contemporary society (Rorty 1985:171) — viz., ‘dry’ work with
no commitment to real people (172).
In contrast, French postmodern social-philosophers were inclined to identify the Habermas view
of modern / anti-modern rationalities as "one more pointless variation on a theme which has been heard
too often" (172). The Habermas consensus view of reality was felt to a metanarrative in itself. For
Lyotard (1984:65-66) such consensus views should be a part of the debate, not the goal of the debate.
Paralogy was a much more meaningful end for philosophical debates on modernity / postmodernity. To
Lyotard, then, the philosophy of Habermas relied upon the contained reasoning of circular interpretation
and re-interpretation. It was insufficient to bring about the kind of permanent revolution in social thinking
and societal circumstances that is demanded (Rorty [on Lyotard] 1985:163). The Habermasian reliance
on the self-correction of data was an effort to scratch where there was no itch (i.e., to constantly test for
legitimacy when legitimacy no longer counted for so much) (164).
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To sum up, neither Habermas or Foucault are commonly deemed to be postmodern
philosophers, yet, their thoughts offer much substance for the postmodern debate on truth and rationality.
From the literature of Habermas, one can find the hope that the benefits of modernity can in fact be
harmonized with the fresher insights of the later age — provided that decent and overall standards of
science and society are sustained. Truths must prevail, and need to be known and decidable.
From the literature of Foucault (and Lyotard), however, comes a stronger insistence that the new
world order must be anti-modern and plural. Consequently, under these views, science and society has
to learn to live with undecidables and to accommodate a whole range of social, cultural and other
paradoxes. And the truths utilized anywhere within society must be grounded, locally. Universal truths
are not possible under French anti-modern, litero-philosophy.
2.2.10 Summary
This part of the literature has examined the literature in philosophy that has addressed the
subject of the use of power and truth by states and institutions in our contemporary period. Taking its
lead from the refreshing observations of Nietzsche as the century opened it has largely been orientated
to the critical theory on domination / subjugation of Habermas and the pseudo-critical-theory of Foucault.
Hence the material covered has largely been a liberal mold of socio-philosophy.
Nietzsche had been the first philosopher to capture the anonymous nature of the processes of
subjugation (Habermas 1987:95). Foucault, perhaps more so than any other philosopher, had inherited
Nietzsche’s recognition of the need to explore the quiet and non-sovereign ways that groups exert their
will on others. Foucault’s analysis of the will-to-power at work showed that civil dominations were
particularly virulent when discourse was able to reinforce and be reinforced by praxis.
But such dominance, and such reinforcements rarely seemed, to Foucault, have been
established ‘overnight’. Like Habermas, he saw that the power to subject usually built up slowly from a
multiplicity of minor, scattered sources (Rabinow 1984:182). And frequently, in the modern state, they
came through the regulation of small detail. Acting in toto, these little processes could "overlap, repeat
or imitate one other" to a large, converging effect (182). In medicine and welfare, Foucault saw ‘bodies’
made docile by such aggregate influence, and in broader society he saw individuals similarly tamed.
The ‘power1 which Nietzsche and Foucault had unearthed, was announced as a new matter of
domination, not a matter of capacity. It was styled as a network of power over people not a stipulated
power over things (Merquior 1985:109). Hence, the power was deemed to be one of asymmetric
influence within given societies — a pancreatic source of dominance which was most strong in closed
institutions where its formation could prove unassailable (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:283). In such
institutions, praxis and discourse combined to form technologies of subjugation, incessantly building
upon the privileged or preferred truth(s) held there (274).
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And to the philosophy of Foucault, an important turnaround had occurred. As power had become
dependent upon truth, it had become subjectless: it was no longer governed by the human competency
of involved actors / players — "power’s truth-dependency [had turned] into the power dependency
of truth" (274).
Foucault had thus seen truth and rational action sedimented within groups and institutions.
Habermas concurred. His own analyses of power and discourse had taught him that under modernity,
the formation of capital had richly and mutually reinforced other sedimenting and subjugating forces (2).
Like Foucault, he saw the resultant docility of individuals and groups to be a form of permanent coercion.
In a sense, the socio-philosophy of both Foucault and Habermas is Durkheimian: they speak of
the cumulative effect of small actions and ongoing processes as if social wholes are observable. And to
illustrate that sort of collectivist or holist perspective, Foucault claims that a new vulnerability had arisen
in broad Western society, where there was an increased tendency for things / institutions / practices /
discourses to reveal inhibitions: he notices "a certain fragility ... in the very bedrock of existence [there]"
(Foucault 1980:80).
As the subsection has indicated, there has been a good deal of criticism of the lack of empiricism
behind Foucault’s observations and of the obscure and protracted nature of Habermas’s writings.
Bernstein (1985:19), however, warns of the danger inherent in paying too much respect to the validity
base of such "theories": it is the overall vision that matters in such atheoretical commentary. The
contribution of Foucault and Habermas (and of Lyotard, Derrida, Barthes, et al) to socio-philosophy is that
they help break philosophy’s traditionally restive view of truth: they help break the equation of ‘truth’ with
‘certainty’. Though Habermas might prefer to retain some concept of an "absolute" or "better" truth, the
inevitable consequence of his insights into institutional communication and of Foucault’s into praxis-
discourse (allied to the work of others, of course) is that truth is now seen to be context-dependent What
counts now, after a dubious Habermas but a confident Foucault, is that "the better truth / the absolute
argument" is now less serviceable in social analysis than "the argument which convinces a given
audience at a given time" (Roily 1985:162).
Perhaps Nietzsche, Foucault and Habermas may be taken as representative of the broader
oxygenation that has come to philosophy during the twentieth century. Philosophical argumentation used
to be, principally, a profound and pre-eminent search for human rationality. But the debate on reason has
spread ubiquitously during the century — and no absolutist or consensual view on the meaning of either
‘truth’ or ‘reason’ is now likely. Too many important desiderata have emerged: the quest for a full or
global rationality, in the social sciences at least, now borders on the naive. What is becoming important
is the competency of researchers in knowing how to construct distinct institutional or inter-subjective
rationalities. Reason, like truth, is now regarded as an entity which must, necessarily, be grounded. The
key is now to discern which aspects of rationality (of, for instance, Burge’s (1987:8) ‘conceptual’, ‘logical’,
‘ortological’, ‘practical’ and other types) are desirable or attainable for the particular context.
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And in examining science, philosophers have inevitably learnt lessons about their own
inclinations. Kuhn (1970) had found that scientists do not implicitly challenge their own working or
structuring ideologies: they largely begin with a tradition and stay within it, so that "even within the exalted
halls of science most [investigators] are content to simply apply what they have taken on faith"
(Haltiangadi 1987:88; emphasis added). Scientific theories are fundamentally ‘collective’ in their
reasoning. And, thereby, they are both social and political, too.
And if science is a matter of social and political productivity, so too is philosophy. Ideas tend
to be wilfully composed: ideas tend to be wilfully neglected. Euistemology in science is now deemed not
to be independent of political action: epistemology in philosophy is now recognized to be redolent with
politics. No philosophy can be pure contemplation or disinterested speculation as tended to be formerly
assumed (Althusser 1976/B:57). It is not possible for philosophy to be neutral (Macdonnell 1986:75).
In this fashion, under the postmodern thought of Rorty and Lyotard:
Philosophy with a capital ‘P’ is no longer a viable or credible enterprise. ... [And]
philosophy, and by extension, theory [has to be] grounded [in] politics and social
criticism. With the demise of foundationalism comes the demise of the view that casts
philosophy in the role of founding discourse... . Thus the term philosophy undergoes
an explicit devaluation; it is cut down to size.... In the new postmodern equation, then,
philosophy is [now] the independent variable, while social criticism and political
practice are dependent variables (Fraser and Nicholson 1988:85).
Philosophy, it seems is no longer a meta-narrative. In exploring legitimacy and truth it has lost its own
legitimacy and privileged truth. Its status as privileged discourse is now replaced by its status on a
participant within interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary discourse.
2.3 THE ANTHROPOLOGY LITERATURE: THE DISCOURSE ON POWER AND TRUTH
2.3.1 Introduction
One of the oddest turns of twentieth century social science has seen what had been regarded
in so many quarters as the relatively backward and casual scientific methodologies of anthropology
suddenly has become quite commonly praised as painstaking and forward-thinking scientific work from
which all other social sciences ought to inspect to gain much refreshing insight. Anthropology is now
being less frequently tabbed as a quixotic art, and more frequently recognized as a bona fide, an
appropriate scientific discipline. "Anthropology, once read mostly for amusement, curiosity, or moral
broadening ... has [itself] become a primary arena of speculative debate.... The way we think now’ [has]
been joined in terms of anthropological material, anthropological methods, and anthropological ideas"
(Geertz 1983:4-5). The quasi-science of old (Kaplan and Manners 1972:ix) is no longer so repeatedly
condemned as being ‘quasi’.
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At first look, the platform concerns that anthropology deals in, amy not appear to be over¬
complex. During the nineteenth century the work of anthropologists principally came to be understood
to amount to, firstly, the examination of the way particular cultural systems work, and secondly, the study
of the way these cultural systems have developed to be as they are (2). Thus, superficially,
anthropologists look for cultural differences and identify cultural similarities.
Sterner inspection, however, reveals that anthropologists face an immense field of inquiry, spread
across "kinship and social organization, politics, technology, economics, religion, language, art, and
mythology" (1) — to list only some of the more immediate issue areas befacing anthropologists. The
breadth of this coverage undoubtedly renders it difficult for strong unities of interest and approach to build
up amongst anthropologists. In the 1970s, for instance, Kaplan and Manners "were impressed repeatedly
by the relative lack in anthropology, as compared with some of the more developed scientific disciplines,
of an accepted or common theoretical language or corpus of theoretical terms" (ix). If Kaplan and
Manners were right — or are still right— anthropology is a field housing a welter of perspectives, avenues
of approach and mix of conceptualizations in contrast to other disciplines which do not have to deal so
expansively with human representativity and human collectivity.
Amongst the definitional debates and the intellectual interchanges that have characterized
anthropology during its development, perhaps, the deepest and most pervasive ‘tension in cognition’ has
been that between enlightenment and romanticist anthropologists (Shweder 1984:28). Shweder
considers that this disaffinity within the discipline is a late round in "the ancient fugue" (30) of the social
and cultural sciences. In anthropology it emanates from the founding enlightenment figures of E.B. Tylor
(1871) and J.G. Frazer (1890), and from Levy-Bruhl (1910).
To Shweder (28)" from the enlightenment view flows a desire to discover universals: the idea of
natural laws, the concept of deep structure, the notion ofprogress or development, and the image of the
history of ideas as a struggle between reason [and] and unreason, science and superstition". And to the
same anthropological theorist comes the perspective that"ideas and practices have their foundation in
neither logic nor empirical science, that ideas and practices fall beyond the scope of deductive and
inductive reason, that ideas and practices are neither rational nor irrational but rather non rational' (28).
Taken together, Tables 2.3.1./1 and 2.3.1./2 now contrast the enlightenment and the romanticist
orientations of anthropology. Table 2.3.1 ./1 illustrates the quest for universal reason across societies that
characterizes enlightenment anthropology, while Table 2.3.1./2 illustrates the quest for the cultural and
subcultural reasonings within made society that typifies romanticist anthropology.
Table 2.3.1./1 might appear to suggest that all enlightenment anthropologists uphold the view
that "the dictates of reason and evidence are the same for all [peoples]'1. This is not in fact, the case.
Some enlightenment anthropologists are indeed UNIVERSALISTS, and they uphold the view, for instance,
that morals are universally obvious to reasons — i.e., to everybody’s reason, even to those of young
children (31). But other enlightenment anthropologists are DEVELOPMENTALISTS, and refuse to support
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TABLE 2.3.1./1
THE ENLIGHTENMENT PERSPECTIVE IN ANTHROPOLOGY:
THE SEARCH FOR THE ANALYTICAL ACTOR AND THE
RATIONAL SOCIETY
■ Basic View of Enlightenment Anthropologists: Allpeople are intentionally rational and
scientific: all people guide their lives by reason and evidence.
| Common Enlightenment Perspectives:
• The beliefs and practices of people bow down before reason and evidence;
• What reason and evidence dictate is the same for all — there are universal/natural laws;
• Reason is felt to be heavily 'scientific* and consists of
- canons of deductive logic;
- patterns of hypothetical reasoning;
- thought guided by principles of statistical inference or
experimental logic;
• Evidence consists of - sense perception;
- the observation of regular connections between things;
• Some peoples are better than others at ‘receiving’ rational/scientific insight (with a heavy
implication that certain ‘alien,’ ‘other,’ ‘primitive’ peoples are particularly deficient in their
capacity to 'read and receive.'
| Exemplary Agendas of Investigation:
• e.g., the universal processes of lexicalization which exist within mundane descriptive
categories;
• e.g., the practices of reason involved in (for instance) rational, irrational and nonrational
‘agreement.’
SOURCE: Adapted from Shweder 1984:27-37.
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the notion that there are universally valid commands of reason and / or evidence that are equally available
to all populations (31). Developmentalists thereby argue that some rules / principles / norms are
uncovered / reached / worked out only by a few ‘civilized’ populations.
Table 2.3.1./2 suggests that romanticist anthropologists do not support conceptualizations of
reality which are strongly coherent or strongly unified. Whorf (1956:55, 214-15, 252) offers a
quintessential romanticist account. He finds that in the world there is "no ideal or unitary pattern of
relative likeness and difference frozen into reality waiting to be discovered" (Shweder on Whorf 1984:44).
Objects are formless, changeable and kaleidoscopic. It is the human mind which imposes classification
upon them. Watanabe’s (1969:376-9) view approximates to Whorf when he states that "there exists no
such thing as a class of similar objects in the world", and Goodman (1968) is a romanticist who sees
culture as that ‘framed’ mass of an arbitrary taxonomy of the world that is passed on from age to age —
indeed, he sees culture as a nonrational, and extralogical.
Certainly to romanticist anthropologists, culture is an arbitrary code (D’Andrade and Romney
1964). Many romanticists press for an anthropology which is symbolic — i.e., an anthropology which
principally revolves around the study of verbal and non-verbal modes of communication. Thus the
arbitrary or expressive codes that romanticists examine are the ‘non-rational ideas’ which are enwrapped
within cultural definitions and cultural presuppositions — expressions which may take the form of actions
just as much as of oral communication, so long as they can be interpreted as speaking for the group /
societal construction of reality. And such codes are inevitably taken to be anti-normative: there are no
standards [of expression or symbols-in-common] worthy of universal respect dictating what to think or how
to act" (Shweder 1984:47).
The debate in anthropology between enlightenment and romanticist theorists concerns the nature
of culture. One could summize that to the former, anthropology is an experimental science (as most
sciences are perhaps conceivably regarded) out to find and formulate laws, while to the latter,
anthropology is an interpretive science in pursuit of variation in meaning. Thus the tendency may be
for enlightenment anthropologists to see the cultures of mankind as ‘a’ or Ihe’ culture — "a self-contained
‘super-organic’ reality with forces and purposes of its own; that is, [a reified entity]" (Geertz 1973:11). And
the counterpoint tendency may be to see culture as Ward Goodenough did, as that which is located in
the minds and hearts of the people in a given society — "[consisting of] whatever it is one has to know
or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members" (Goodenough [in Geertz: 1973J11).
Thus, anthropology as a science has recently been subject to considerable disaccord. Shweder
1984:51 -57) illustrates this tension by highlighting the manner inwhich relatively established Tylorian-cum-
Frazerian views of rational and scientific societies have been undermined by romanticist thoughtlines.
As Table 2.3.1./3 portrays, romanticist thinking has ‘questioned’ or ‘inverted’ a number of what were
somewhat stable perspectives.
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TABLE 2.3.1./2
THE ROMANTICIST PERSPECTIVE IN ANTHROPOLOGY:
THE SEARCH FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTOR AND THE
BUILT SOCIETY
■ Basic View of Romanticist AnthropologIsts: Each people live in a distinct 'cultural’; each
people have a self-contained ‘social order' (i.e., framework) from comprehending
experience.
■ Common Enlightenment Perspectives:
• Distinguishable populations/communities have their own self-sufficient ‘designs-for-living’;
• These separate ‘designs-for-living’ are not easily or comfortably comparable in terms of
normative evaluation;
• Science — particularly social science — is felt to be predominantly a matter of ideology,
as is ‘reason’;
• Tradition, religion and ritual are indispensable components of human thought and practice;
• ‘Other1, ‘alien’, ‘different’ peoples ought not to be designated in relation to a standard
emergent from any particular culture.
| Exemplary Agendas of Investigation:
• e.g., The content of group/societal thought: communicated values and presuppositions;
• e.g., The acquisition of ideas: tacit or explicit.
SOURCE: Adapted from Shweder 1984:27-48.
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Table 2.3.1 ./3 explains some of the tension between enlightenment and romanticist views of —
in this instance — cognitive anthropology. Enlightenment anthropology has been experimentalist in this
field, notably through the adaption of the ideas of the cognitive psychologist, Piaget. To Piaget and his
followers knowledge is invented by individuals who respond to the practical exigencies of reality.
Romanticist thinkers, however, do not necessarily think that Piaget is wrong in nominating the significance
of logico-scientific reasoning for the individual, but they do believe his views are dangerously incomplete.
They suggest that an individual’s understanding is also critically influenced (as the table indicates) by the
social-learning inherent or implicit in nonrational behavior and in expressive communication. Such social
theorists suggest that in order to comprehend the understanding held by groups and societies,
researchers should explore not just its inferential reasoning (as Piaget did) but also its language games
(as Habermas, Foucault and others have proposed elsewhere).
Hence, as Table 2.3.1./3 implies, romanticist anthropologists are insisting that the concepts of
culture that various societies have should not just be examined in terms of the reasonings behind it, but
also for the meanings it imparts. To Geertz (1973:230-231) anthropology can be scientific, in terms of
the disinterested endeavor of the researcher to critically and diagnostically examine given cultural traits
and practices. But to Geertz, anthropology can also be ideological, in terms of the necessarily interested
and involved endeavor of the investigator ‘to establish and defend’ patterns of belief and value. To Geertz
the lines of work are different: the scientific approach is intensively differentiate, and the ideological
approach is justificatory and apologetic (231). And to Geertz, a scientific understanding that is not
tempered by or with ideological insight is unreliable intelligence. Indeed, the gain of ideological insight
should conceivably precede the effort to win scientific knowledge: "the so-called function of science vis-a-
vis ideologies is first to understand them — what they are, now they work, what gives rise to them — and
second to criticize them, to force them to come to terms with (but not necessarily to surrender to) reality"
(232).
Romanticists in anthropology, like Geertz, seek to examine not only "the deep structures or
hypothesized processes underlying their thoughts [but also and rather] by the surface content of what they
say and do to each other in the here and now. [They maintain that] the more anthropologists attend to
surface content, the less common is the culture of [peoples]" (Shweder 1984:48; emphasis added).
The sustained debate between enlightenment and romanticist anthropologists ironically mirrors
many of the wider contentions of contemporary social science. In the past, there had been a tendency
to regard the work of anthropologists as "a snug and insular enterprise" (Geertz 1983:3). But as the
broader human and social sciences have been infused with the refreshing twentieth century insights of
Wittgenstein, Gadamer and Ricoeur, such analysts as Jameson and Fish, and such all-purpose
subversives as Foucault, Habermas, Barthes and Kuhn so "any simple return to [a fundamentally
scientific-] technological conception of those sciences is highly improbable” (4). The wider field of social
science has been swept to where insular romanticist anthropology has long been pitched. The modem,
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pluralistic and localized frameworks of other social sciences now parallel the engaged approaches of
romanticist cultural anthropologists:
Long one of the most homespun of disciplines, hostile to anything smacking of
intellectual pretension and unnaturally proud of an outdoorsman image, [romanticist
cultural] anthropology has turned out, oddly enough, to have been preadapted to some
of the most advanced varieties of modern opinion. The contextualist, antiformalist,
relativizing tendencies of the bulk of that opinion — depicted, charted, represented —
rather than the way it intrinsically is, have been rather easily absorbed by adventurous
scholars used to dealing with strange perceptions and stronger stories. [Romanticist
cultural anthropologists] have, wonder of wonders, been speaking Wittgenstein all along
(4).
Thus the broader realm of social sciences now moves to also accommodate hermeneutic and
local understanding. Anthropological formulations of meaning, symbol and text are now under close and
particular examination elsewhere. Symbolic-culture has now surfaced rather ubiquitously across the
human and social sciences.
2.3.2 Outlook on Power and Truth
Enlightenment views on or of power and truth differ quite considerably from romanticist views
in anthropology, as one might expect.
Enlightenment perspectives were seen in subsection 2.3.1. to be universalistordevelopmentalist.
Universalist perspectives tend to examine different societies in order to induce the common ways across
those societies in which they have rationalized the use of power or have ‘reasoned’ an appropriate history
for themselves.
Such common practices are not of such prime interest to development anthropologists, however.
Developmentalist anthropologists are more alert to the directives on power and history that are issued by
virtuosos or experts within the particular community or society. Developmentalists assume that such truth-
holders have added levels of awareness about the appropriate need for propitiously applied power (in
order to sustain that community in its natural environment and geography) or about the pre-requisite need
for a ‘decent’ history (which teaches the population how they came to live where they live and conceivably
how they should continue to live in the light of that past set of experiences).
The above is a purist explanation of universalist and developmentalist enlightenment. In practice
in anthropology, both the universalist and developmentalist view have emerged within the field of
ethnoscience, which has explored different societies folk knowledges (e.g., Agar 1973), everyday systems
of classification (e.g., Levi-Strauss 1966) and commonplace processes of inference (e.g., Hutchins 1980;
Shweder 1984:32). Recent ethnoscience has recaste the Tyler / Frazer view of ‘other’ / ‘alien’ peoples
as ‘primitive’ or ‘deficient’ thinkers by attempting to present unified accounts of different thought systems
about the world. Such contemporary ethnoscience attempts to account for the seeming ‘scientific’ or
‘logical’ deficiencies of the reasoning of such people by revealing ‘the closed intellectual predicament’ in
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which they live. Such peoples have a lack of information regarding alternative approaches to
understanding. Consequently neo-Tylorian and neo-Frazerian research in ethnoscience now seeks to
develop more robust concepts on the rationalities within traditional societies — that is, by adapting richer
and more discerning schemas of irrationality and nonrationality along with rationality (37-38).
In terms of romanticist theory, perhaps the most relevant work for our understanding of power
and truth has come in cognitive anthropology with the definitional work of culture as an arbitrary code
(D’Andrade and Romney 1964). In cognitive anthropology, enlightenment researchers tend to emphasize
the rational, scientific and quasi-scientific knowledge structures that underpin a societies thoughtlines and
approved forms of behavior. But in the same field, it is romanticist researchers who have conceivably
made longer and larger leaps of understanding by exploring the surface and arbitrary representations of
culture. Hence religion can be interpreted as an expressive or arbitrary ‘integrative system’, as an
‘ideology’, and conceivably also as a ‘power1 or ‘truth’. Each of these interpreted ‘systems’ may be
interpreted via nonrational ideas and by verbal or nonverbal modes of communication. Hence Geertz
(1973) has looked at ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, and Sahlins (1976) has delved similarly into the
integrative yet expressive and arbitrary ‘meaning’ of ‘Practical Reason’.
In the purist sense, romanticist anthropologists work in the area of symbolic anthropology, where
‘expressive symbols’ constitute any item or concept that speaks for a different thing. An expressive
symbol can be a person, an object, an insignia — and clearly, such expressive or symbolic items can be
redolent with meaning in regard to the exercise of power or of the maintenance of historical truths.
Expressive symbols can ‘stand for1 authority, can ‘convey’ legitimacy, and can ‘identify’ a sought
authenticity.
To Peirce (1955) there are three chief types of expressive ‘representations’:
• symbols — which have no intrinsic or causal relationship with their referents;
• icons — which resemble their referent in some important characteristic; and,
• indexes — which are assumed to be the reason for, the result of, or a co-recurrent feature in
association with the referent.
Thus romanticist anthropologists would tend to investigate the salient symbols of power and
historical truth in a particular society. Just as so many of the conventions of a group or community from
dining grace (Elias 1978) to norms of fashion (Sahlins 1976) are arenas for such symbolic representativity,
so there will inevitably be arenas for symbolic expression within ‘power1 and ‘historical truth’. For instance,
national emblems may apply to both. In matters of ‘power1, a musical anthem may represent ‘the
supreme power of the state’; in matters of history, a designated date may speak for ‘the glorious activities
of select antecedents’.
Romanticist anthropologists then would tend to explore the expressive and arbitrarybackground
to the exercise of power and to the projection of historical truth. Thereby they would largely be
investigating the existential ‘face’ or ‘character’ of the society— matters which the logics and the scientific
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analyses of enlightenment approaches are not yet very good at making intelligible. Romanticists thus
would tend to look towards those things which reflect the capricious display of power or the discretionary
exhibition of particular historical truths in order to find the important meanings and values of the social
order under review. And such romanticist perspectives would be anti-narrative: the romanticist
anthropologist would not be expecting to find any notions or conceptualizations about ‘power1 and
‘historical truth’ which would determine thought and / or behavior for a whole mix or range of societies.
Romanticist anthropology would tend to champion "the coequality of fundamentally different ‘frames’ of
understanding" (Shweder 1984:48) for the power within a social order, as it would for truth.
The remainder of this introduction to anthropology’s contemporary outlook on powerand historical
truth now picks its way through some of recent romanticist literature on these twinned Foucauldian
subjects of power and truth.
In investigating different societies, Geertz considers that anthropologists principally are concerned
with the study of thought in cultures. To him, "human thought is basically both social and public"
(Geertz 1973:45) in lieu of being that which happens in the head. Hence thinking can be seen as "a
traffic in ... significant symbols... anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and [is] used
to impose meaning upon experience" (45). Thus, to Geertz, culture ought not to be seen so much as a
feet of "concrete behavior patterns — customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters — as has, by and large,
been the case" (44), but as a mix of rules and recipes of control which govern the behavior of the
community.
In this respect, Geertz views anthropology almost as Durkheim views sociology. What to Geertz
(in anthropology) are devices and programs of control, approximate to the disciplinary forces of
Durkhemian sociology. Both focus on what Geertz deems to be "the extragenetic, outside-the-skin control
mechanisms ... for ordering behavior" (44), though anthropologists have tended historically to search for
them in exotic / removed / unknown societies and sociologists in relatively immediate / at hand / urban-
industrial communities. In their respective disciplines, moreover, Geertzian anthropologists and
Durkhemian sociologists study the expressive and arbitrary way in which populations create themselves.
In recent years romanticist anthropologists have found the study of ‘celebration’ within societies
to be a notably rich area for the investigation of outside-the-skin control mechanisms. All societies
celebrate the precious things and events which they consider renders them a ‘special’ or ‘proud’ people.
And celebrations such as festivals and rituals say much about a population’s regimes of power and its
orientation to historical truth.
Turner has been notably active in researching the historical situation and the symbolic universe
of celebrants within different societies (Rinzel and Seitel 1982:8). He has theorized about the meanings
behind ‘peak experiences’, ‘culturally shared events’, and ‘sacra’ (holy things) (Turner 1982:11-13). In
calculating the evocative powers of celebratory powers for a given people, he has found some symbols
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to be multivocal (for those which represent many things simultaneously), some to be multivalent (for those
with various meanings or values), and some to be polysemous (for those open to several meanings).
To Babcock (1978) celebrations are frames in which communities or settlements can observe,
analyze and savor themselves through the staged construction and / or deconstruction of ‘real’ or
‘idealistic’ representations of themselves. Where the comradeship, communion or flow is strong,
‘lineaments of fear and glory’ and ‘communitas’ itself are reinforced (Turner 1982:29). Where the
celebration involves the imparting of esoteric knowledge or ‘real’ truths (the final gnosis), all previous
interpretations of truth for that subject / object are supposed to be annulled (19).
And, by extension, romanticist anthropologists recognize that celebrations and commensurations
can bind a given population firmly together in the ritualized recreation of a legendary past (Dorson
1982:55). Nationalists within given societies tend to select symbols and events which express ideas that
evoke the distant origins of ‘the nation’ (Kapferer 1989:189). On such occasions nationalist rituals and
celebrations can become presentations of extreme cultural self-consciousness (193). Identity and
historical truths become acutely reciprocal.
Romanticist anthropologists are drawn then — in looking at historical truth — to investigate the
systems of meaning that a given population invests in its evocative social forms. And the work of such
anthropologists is quite distinct to that of historians:
Seen through [romanticist] anthropologists’ eyes, myth, ritual, and symbol are no longer
historical trivia, decorative elements that can be tacked onto the serious subjects of
analysis when they do not obscure these altogether; they become vital clues,
interwoven with and revealing the very issues considered the real stuff of history
(Appadurai 1986:x).
Borrowing from Durkheim (1976; ordinal publication date of 1912), romanticist anthropologists
are inclined to acknowledge that all societies need to preserve distinct parts of their heritage and
environment as ‘sacred’. Within the culture of each society, certain things remain unambiguouslysingular
— resistant to commoditization and / or protected from common everyday use (Kopytoff 1986:73). And
romanticist anthropologists are particularly keen to know who (or which institutions) in the society in
question has the right to singularize objects — that is the right to sacralize or monopolize particular
things, places or events (73). Consonantly, they recognize that sacralized things, places and events have
a quite different sense of ownership, space and time from the other ‘social things’ of the everyday world
(Abrahams 1982:167).
Romanticist anthropologists are critically interested in celebratory behavior as pointedly ‘framed’
behavior, and as ‘supreme acts of sociation’ (Turner 1982:28). With celebratory events, anthropologists
can explore in stark and concentrated fashion the powers behind sociation, and the preferred truths.
Celebratory historical happenings are highly visible demonstrations of political as well as civic power.
At times of ritual and festival, romanticist anthropologists can find simple symbolic features such as flags
to be "[highly] redolent of [that community’s] message of endurance" (Abraham 1982:172). To restate
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Appadurai (1986:4), so many commodities, persons and places have ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ lives. Such are
the meaning-laden powerplays of truth and the politics of value as are currently cropping up in the
literature of romanticist anthropologists.
2.3.3 Similar Investigations
The goal of anthropology — as of most disciplines — lies in the gaining of communication of
cognitive knowledge. More specifically, the aim of anthropological inquiry is the winning of what Kaplan
and Manning (1972:28) style as public reliable knowledge about sociocultural affairs. In a nutshell
this means the improvement in our understanding of two broad questions:
• How do cultural systems work? and,
• How have they come to be as they are? (35 and 54).
Clearly, enlightenment anthropologists will tend to focus upon the rationalities inherent in the
working design of human societies (and in the actions of social members) while romanticist
anthropologists will largely prefer to work with the contents of thought in currency in a society — viz., the
values and presuppositions rather than the rationalities — and will concentrate primarily upon how
different specific groups of people within a society classify and communicate (Shweder 1984:48).
In order to weigh up how the current literature suggests that anthropologists investigate ‘power’
and ‘truth’, it is first necessary to observe the literature suggests that anthropologists look at all cultural
questions. And in the investigation of cultural matters, it should be realized that anthropologists face a
major difficulty in data gathering: "not only does the anthropologist operate within his own conceptual
framework, but the people he [or she] studies operate within their own conceptual framework or
frameworks" (22). Thus, these frameworks can clash in terms of the clash between what Pike (1967)
nominated as emic versus etic (Harris 1979:32-35) objectivity. Hence the anthropologist has to resolve
how to evaluate the quality of a given informants descriptions on accounts: shall real / meaningful /
adequate ‘native’ emic judgements apply, or shall the more ‘scientifically productive’ etic standards of
differences and similarities apply (32).
In the last two decades, considerable controversy has arisen over the emic / etic debate. Pike
is, according to Harris (35) a cultural idealist and he (Pike) favors the use of emic standards of analysis
because he believes that the aim of social science is to analyze emic systems. Thus cultural idealists
favor the winning of an insider view of societies.
But insider views of groups / communities / states can be exceedingly deceptive. When
questioned, insiders tend to interpret things "as they ought to be", and load their observations consciously
and subconsciously with their own petty and / or substantive rationalizations (Pitt-Rivers 1967:31-32).
Insiders tend to have incomplete "knowledge of the total outline of [each or any] of their social structures"
(Malinowski 1961:25 and 83). And there can be no constant / infallible way of gaining verstehen (i.e.,
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empathizing) with or capturing an emic viewpoint: emic viewpoints are inescapably "translated" whenever
an outside observer is involved — "one [researcher’s or person’s] verstehen differs from the next"
(Kapland and Manners 1972:27).
Yet there are further crucial reasons why an anthropologists’ objectivity towards culture, ipso
facto, can be limited. Kaplan and Manners (28-31) present four of them in comparison to the manner in
which knowledge is gained in the natural and physical sciences:
• Historicity.
Natural / physical scientists can largely assume that they are dealing with relatively stable
structures, but societies can change rapidly and comprehensively (29):"... a societymay change
from one type to another, sometimes with great suddenness and violence" (Evans-Pritchard
1962:55).
• Open Nature of Socio-Cultural Systems
Anthropologists tend to have to deal with highly open systems, tend to have to consider large
numbers of variables and are usually unable to exert control over the variables they deem to be
critical (Kaplan and Manners 1972:29).
• Social Reactivity
Anthropologists tend to have a duty to respond to problems / issues / concerns that are highly
visible and which are generated out-wide in society. They are not so free as natural / physical
scientists to follow research agendas generated by the internal progress of the science. Thus,
anthropologists are drawn into the endeavor to solve grand problems that are largely
‘unsolvable’, while natural / physical scientists can work much more frequently hidden from larger
society — albeit an often indifferent larger society (Brodbeck 1954:146-47).
• Ideology
Anthropologists deal, like a number of other disciplines, in the highly nebulous matter of ideology:
they have to theorize about theories in society! They may not at all be aware of the degree to
which they themselves filter the ideologies of host communities on logical, moral or other
extrascientific criteria.
Such are some of the limitations which constrain the degree to which, operationally,
anthropologists can gain error-free, public reliable knowledge about culture. Now attention will be put to
the limitations that affect the capacity of anthropologists to build up organizing theories about culture —
and thereby about ‘power* and truth’.
Since its origins as a science, anthropology has approached the study of culture from four main
orientations. These are "evolutionism", "functionalism", "history" and "cultural ecology", and they are
deconstructed in Table 2.3.3./1 in terms of the strengths of their organizing viewpoint on culture and in
terms of the outlook they offer for the study of ‘power’ and truth’. Generally, the twentieth century has
seen the ascendancy of relativistic-functionalist approaches over the formerly predominant evolutionary,
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developmentalist or ‘social Darwinist’ standpoints (Kaplan and Manners 1972:36-7). This has lead to the
understanding that nineteenth century principles in anthropology were inclined to be highly ethnocentric,
and were inclined to see the development of societies and culture or unilineal, supposedly culminating in
the moral and intellectually superiorities of the Western civilization / civilizations.
Of the orientations accounted for in Table 2.3.3./1, evolutionism is presented in contemporary
form as distinct from its highly ethnocentric nineteenth century precursor perspective (38), and
functionalism is offered as the dominant orientation with regard to frequency and depth of support during
the twentieth century— indeed, Davis (1959:752-72) had recognized that in certain social science circles,
functionalism is synonymous with anthropological and / or sociological analysis. Then, to complete the
coverage of lead perspectives, historical explanation is presented as a form of constructivist enterprise
(pertinent to the thinking of relevant populations active in the reconstruction / deconstruction of their
ethnographic heritage) and cultural evolution is offered as perhaps that which (of the four) has most fed
contemporary anthropology.
A number of further points warrant clarification about the table.
Firstly, the table presents only idealized accounts of each of the orientations. In application, each
theoretical orientation is inclined to be used much more approximately, and possibly in combination with
another orientation.
Secondly, the four orientations do not share a constant conceptualization of culture — as their
principal point of investigation — nor indeed do they, for ‘power’ or ‘truth’. For instance, under
functionalism, culture is generally deemed to be ‘a system’, whereas under Boasianism (as a
representative school favoring historically-explanative theories) culture at times becomes an haphazard
admixture of distinct components (72), and under some ecological perspectives, culture ceases to be the
pivotal point of inquiry, being replaced by "populations of organisms as the basic unit of analysis” (86).
Thirdly, the orientations tend to reify the existence of societies as distinct 'cultures’ and as stable
acculurating societies. Yet across the world, many societies are forced societies, formed by an act of
will rather than through tradition — the U.S.A., amongst them (Washburn 1982:298). In such places, the
culture may be mass, individualized and short-of-communitas, rather than stable and singularly ‘tribal’
(298). In the U.S.A., furthermore one might suspect that polyglot Americanization is not something done
as a matter of course to newly arriving immigrants by the culture, it is also just done at scale by newly
arriving immigrants to the culture.
Fourthly, the concept of ‘the environment’ tends to change significantly across the orientations.
Under evolutionism and fundamentalism, the environment is inclined to be regarded as a set of external
influences. But under historical exploration and cultural ecology an important distinction is made between
‘the environment’, ipso factor, and ‘the effective (or realized) environment’ — viz., that which is
conceptualized, manufactured or identified-as-significant by the given culture-holders. In this sense, and
importantly, "the environment [ceases to be] a natural thing: [it becomes] a set of interrelated precepts,
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a product of culture" (Leach 1965:25, 37-38; Frake 1962:53-59). If the environment can be faithfully
conceptualized as ‘a cultural product’, there seems to be little resistance to acknowledging that anything
or everything is (or can be) a cultural product. The world suddenly becomes so much more
ambiguous, and the need to proceed with extreme vigilence on the identification of meaning is all the
more crucial.
None of the platform orientations given in Table 2.3.3./1 are therefore offered as all-powerful or
robust perspectives. They each offer a clarity of vision on ‘culture’, ‘power’ and ‘truth’, but each has its
contrarieties and its irresolutions.
With regard to the strength of insight that is gatherable whatever the theoretical orientation, it
needs to be emphasized that anthropologists (so frequently working independently and poorly resourced
within isolated locales) have tended to build up for their discipline a breadth of coverage, but a relatively
poor depth of analysis (Kaplan and Manners 1972:25). The sustained fear was that this practice was
inclined to place the resultant / emergent objectivity upon the work of individual anthropologists and not
upon the discipline as a whole — a worry that has since begun to dissipate with the 1980s advances on
the design of approaches such as naturalistic inquiry (and its consonant development of the Lincoln and
Guba (1985:292) trustworthiness criteria to replace ‘objective’ considerations) as given under subsection
1.3.5.
Table 2.3.3./1 says much, moreover, about the a priori nature of these main four anthropological
outlooks on science. When ‘power’ or ‘truth’ are being questioned, the investigator / operator under each
of the four orientations already is inclined to have preformed notions on how ‘power1 or ‘truth’ work (i.e.,
contribute to society). For the evolutionist, ‘power’ and ‘truth’ are matters of quality, for the functionalist
they are matters of performance, for the historian they are matters of inheritance and for the ecologist,
they are matters of adaptation. It seems that while "even the most intelligent ‘native’ or ‘local respondent’
may be unaware of the way in which system and structure [read ‘power’ or ‘truth’] impinge upon his [sic!]
day-to-day behavior" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:24), the inquiring ethnographer has already made his
/ her mind up. And that very judgement, moreover, may be qualified through an odd double-standard:
When the members of tribe ‘X’ exhibit cruel and sadistic behavior toward others — for
example, head hunting — their behavior is not fit to be condemned but understood, the
relativist [anthropologist] would say, in terms of the way in which the act fits into the
broader cultural pattern of that society. But let a Northern or Southern racist [in the
U.S.A.] in our own society act out his fears by barring the school enhance to a Negro
[sic!] child and his behavior is sure to be condemned by the same relativist (42).
In the first instance, seemingly objective insight is further qualified by a relativistic-paternalism, and in the
latter by a nonrelativistic evolution. Such perspectival difficulties only wash out when the investigated
events are comprehensively presented in terms of grounded / situated / contextualized knowledge. In
ethnography, it is hard to escape this need for thick description.
TABLE2.3.3./1
THELEADH ORETICALORI NT IONSIANTHROPOL GY: FOURIDEALAPPROACHESTOWARDP WENRUT
Theoretical Orientation
ContemporaryEvolutionism
Functionalism
HistoricalExplanation
CulturalEcology
BaaicView
of
Orientation
Culturesevolve progressively;th experiencesofsocietiesa collectiveandumulati .
Theinstitutionsand structuresofao i tyre inter-connectedforma fullyunctionalsystem.
Thepast-historiesof peoplesarr ally contemporaryhistories;th originsfpeoplearela ly concocted.
Cuituresadapttoh environmentaroundthe ; andsocietiesdaptt othersocietiesabout them.
Strengthof Orientation
Abletoconsiderulturwrit large;its‘belief’hasigh credibility(similartobiol gical evolution).
Explainshowcultural phenomenoninterrelate;s ‘belief’hasghcredibility (societyiastable organism).
Accommodateshistoricaland environmentala d psychologicalfact rst explainthepastofeople; worksbetterthan ‘evolutionism’and functionalism’ theicro/ localevel.
Takeslong-rangevi wof societyorratherfhumanity; providesforanct vr l forpeople(responsivyet proactive).
Weakness
of
Orientation
Assumesunlin arityof development,which (historically)manfroze ,non¬ advancingsocietiesrefu . Ignoresfactthatcultural systemscanbe ome specializedabso utely,buonl inregardtosomething.
Assumesthatebound ri
ofagroup/societyefixed andeasytor ce.Itca not readilyaccountforstruct ral changes,andassumesth t activitiest keplacinord r
tocreate/ausoccasion important‘unique’ distinguishableevents.
Assumesthatpecificc lture areconcr tesystemslo a d
intimeandspace.Produ s anonfunctional,fragme ted ‘shreds-and-patches’viewof culture.
Assumesthatpeoplec n usetheclimateand environmentmechanistically.
Itcannotreadilyexplainwh t 'anenviro mental opportunity’ r'an environmentallimitation's absoluteterms.Inclined towardssimplistic environmentaldet rmi ism. Failstoseehatwhati seenasthenvironment’i aproductofculture.
TABLE2.3.3./1(Continued)
Theoretical Orientation
ContemporaryEvolutionism
Functionalism
HistoricalExplanation
CulturalEcology
ExemplaryRegard for/overp w
Tendstolo kf rculturalregularities overtime,e.g.,thwayco e institutionsadapttondexploitheir environment.
Tendstolo kf rpost hocexplanations—i. ., ascriptionsoffunct ons ofpowertinstitutions. Tendstoappear ‘reasonable’.
Tendstoview accumulationsofpower as‘accidental’r therto continuousa d recurrent.
Tendstolo kf r environmental possibilism,where harmonywith/con rol overthenvironment producesec nomic andpoliticalwer.
PossibleCla mOver PowerinTexas Heritage
The‘stat ’/national’i s itu ionsf Texasevolvednaturally;riv institutionswere/arepredesti edto fail.
The‘state’/‘national’ institutionsofTexas haveprop rr lt playinthestewardship andcareofheritag .
Thepastiselectively inspected,andthe originalstoryli es adoptedccentuatethe reflectedpastofthos Texansalive/notable today.
Certainsignifica t Texansb came powerfulbecause thewayereabl tomanipulatehe ecosystem.
ExemplaryRegard for/overT uth
Tendstoseeculturehangas inevitable/natural;truth knowledgebecomesetter(i. ., morescientificandrati al).
Tendstoseeruthas sharedcognitive orientations,where,as such,theirexistenceia prerequisiteforeachand everysuccessfulo i ty.
Tendstoseehpast/ origins/antecedencef peopleasrelativistic;th t particularizesopulations today.
Tendstolo kf rruth whichreflectth reciprocityof environmentoculture andcultureon environment.
PossibleCla mover theTruthsabout TexasH ritage
Theproper‘truths’arosat explaina'specific’or(b tters ill) ‘general’evolutionforthepeoplef Texas.
Theproper‘truths’in Texasarethoset unifyapopulat onr integrateamixof people;truthsmust integrateTexans.
Noproper‘truths’exist
forTexas;alln storylinesa e constructions,andmany, manyarevalid.
Properrultimate truths’areosewhere theTexanpeoplear seenaspartofthfull ecosystemorverall bioticcommunityin ‘geophysicalT xa ’.
316
In this way, relativism, "long an important message of ethnography abroad, has now become a
commonplace of liberal discourse at home [in the West]" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:135). Perhaps this
is the contribution of recent anthropological work to our comprehension of power, truth, and culture:
relativism ought to start at home!
2.3.4 Related Inquiries
In anthropology the emergent field of applied anthropology is gradually assuming the or a right
to handle research into matters of state that have a bearing on heritage. This subsection (2.3.4) will
consider the insights that are being experimented with as is revealed in the literature of this growing area
of social intervention approaches. While few of the techniques covered relate precisely or exclusively with
heritage stewardship and / or management, per se, there is considerable cognizance to be gained from
the neighboring areas of social anthropology and policy development that applied anthropologists are is
increasingly venturing into.
Applied anthropology is pragmatic research applied by practicing anthropologists to solve an
endless variety of human problems. It embraces many different styles of practice, including advocacy
anthropology, action anthropology and development anthropology. Applied anthropology places a heavy
emphasis on the endeavor to get research findings used. It seeks to make particular sorts of data or
insight accessible — as pointedly as is possible — for or to those decision makers in government (or in
otherwise significant positions) who can adopt it in the enactment of their duties and responsibilities.
‘Applied anthropology’ is anthropology’s attempt to influence human affairs (Rappaport 1986:1).
it is the attempt to translate the theories and the findings of anthropological investigations directly to the
amelioration of social problems. It is that set of efforts to build "a stronger anthropological voice in the
public ear" (Gilbert 1989:71). Based on the ideology of the facilitation of self-determination by
communities, groups and individuals, it is now applied in many fields such as health, mental health,
welfare, urban development and rural sociology (Cohen 1989:306). And while direct and singular
applications to historical truth and heritage matters may be as yet rare in the literature, much valuable
insight can be translated from these parallel ‘social problems’ to the social problem of heritage.
Whatever the human affairs area of interest, applied anthropology is conducted with a strong
value orientation: it is pragmatic, it is democratic (van Willigen 1986:xiii). "It is not about getting people
to change against their will, it is about helping people [to] express their wilt’ (xiii). It is the attempt to apply
sound anthropological theory to everyday public affairs — the attempt to identify the appropriate variables
which can and ought be acted upon. But it is work founded on the ethical principles of informed consent
and voluntary participation of the communities, groups and / or individuals involved.
Generally, applied anthropological approaches seek to help a community towards developmental
change, i.e., towards its long-term adaptability. It is research-in-practice, undertaken for, with or on behalf
of groups in conflict with or misunderstood by government or by "more powerful political forces" (xvi). Its
317
goal is more effective inter-group understanding and, hence, the smoothing of culture contact. In
attempting to solve such practical problems, the applied anthropologist is not just a purist researcher in
the specialist sense. He / she can or must adopt from a multiplicity of available research related roles -
- as depicted in Table 2.3.4./1.
The table suggests that there is a considerable range of styles of work which falls under the orbit
of applied anthropology. Most of the fourteen roles outlined are ‘responsive’ work styles: the form of the
work done or services provided tends to be defined more substantively by the nature of the public problem
in question and not so much the strictures of the discipline. Hence the fourteen roles are potential
techniques by which the experienced anthropologist can mix his grounded research with situated
action. The aim of this ‘research-plus’ activity is the facilitation of "[appropriate] changes in human
behavior [which are believed to be able to solve or lessen] contemporary social, economic, and technical
problems, rather than developing social and cultural theory [ipso facto]' (Foster 1969:54; emphasis
added). Thus, the fourteen roles constitute a complex set of related research-based instruments which
are used to initiate direct action and help formulate ameliatory public policy (van Willigen 1986:8). In
application, they are research styles which feed off raw data, which target relevant policy areas, but which
are engineered towards interventionist action. And they are usable particularly in those situations where
a society or community has meaningful and sustained authority over the individuals within it.
The gain of insight from the parallel deployment of applied anthropological techniques is not a
straightforward matter. Applied anthropologists are not inclined to publish their work in conventional
locales or in orthodox formats, and the literature that survives is "fugitive" (Clark and van Willigen 1981).
Furthermore, few academic journals are equipped to cover submissions which are primarily applied
pieces. Consequently the existing impact and potential impression of applied anthropology upon
supposedly ‘theoretical’ anthropology is prone to being heavily obscured.
Despite that masked effect, van Willigen (1986) has been able to trace the increased attending
of cultural affairs research to applied anthropology. He has noted how:
• the rate of published applied anthropology documentation has slowly increased (20);
• the use of value-stated approaches has proliferated (21; 29);
• experimentation in a wider range of problem area and political contexts has multiplied (23):
• the absorption of applied methods into interactive planning schemes has enlargened (29); and
how,
• the targeted emphasis of applied anthropology upon policy formulation has intensified (33-4).
As use of applied anthropology is tempered, a high proportion of the client groups and
communities benefiting from it have become more politically sophisticated. In many regards, it is the
extended pressures of these outside parties that have considerably boosted the appeal of and need for
TABLE2.3.4./1
RESEARCHOLESINAPP I DANTHROPOLOGY:
ASPPLIEDTOPUBLICAFFAIRSINGE ERALDHERIT GAF AI SIPARTICULA COMMONROLESINAPPUEDANTHROPOLOGYCO MONILLUST ATIOTHPERTINENCEFHIST RIC LSTEWARDSHI ADMINISTRATIONOFHUMANPOLICYPR BLEMS PROBLEMS
1POLICYRESEARCHERThegath ringon relevantinformatiouponwhichtbasepolicy decisions. 2EVALUATORThedeterminationastow ether aproject,programolicyisw rking effectively;acommonplacr le. 3IMPACTASSESSORThespecialized predictionoftheeffe saproj ct,rogram policy. 4NEEDSASSESSORThegath ringofda an publicrogramneedsianticipationoffuture programformulation. 5PLANNERTheparticipationintdes gnof futureprog ams,jectsandpolicies. 6RESEARCHANALYSTTheinterpretationof researchr ultsfodeci ionmakers. 7ADVOCATETheempatheticsu portof communitygroupsinordertdirect/c ax politicalactionpropriatefothe rprof ssed goals.
e.g.,Theuseoftraditionalethnographicresearch otherspecializedrese rchtechniqu sdetermin baselinef cts. e.g.,Thedeterminationastow ethergiven healthorwelfareprogr madsuccessful outcomes. e.g.,Theassessmentofthimpacts substantialland-usedevelopmentonlocal communitiesinordertinfluencengo ngdesi n. e.g.,Theassessmentofsocial/he ltheduca on
/otherneedsi rdertjustifyatt ntionthemi futureprograms. e.g.,Thecollectionfdatainr lationtspec fic localaspectsfnewlarg r/re ionalst t wide plan. e.g.,Theprovisionofsupport/a x l arytranslative aidforgovernmentpolicymake sand/orpl nn rs. e.g.,Themediatoryrolinhelp nglocalgr ups expresstheiropinionsa dctu oth m.
e.g.,Theidentificationofthistoricaltruthsand mythsthatapplyoparticulareop eorarea. e.g.,Thedeterminationastow omx i g heritagepoliciesactuallydserve. e.g.,Theidentificationofthimpa slarg developmentuponsignifica t/acreds tesa d historicalfea u es. e.g.,Thecollectionfopinionsand/orpr fer nces onrecog izedrunrecog dhist ricalassets. e.g.,Theidentificationofin-sitesignif ances( theground)atsacr doimpo tanthist ical ‘theater*. e.g.,Theinterpretationofhcont mp rary communitysignificanceofinheritedmythsa d tales. e.g.,Theclarificationfor/w thnbe alff communityasti spreferredop rationalcour (s) ofactionregardingheritagecare.
TABLE2.3.4./1(Continued)
COMMONROLESINAPPU DNTHROPOLOGY
COMMONILLUSTRATIONNTHE ADMINISTRATIONOFHUM NPOLICY PROBLEMS
PERTINENCEFORHISTORICALSTEWA DSHIP PROBLEMS
8TRAINERhedevelopmentandusftr ini g approaches/materialfolocgr upn particularareasofneed.
e.g.,Theguidanceofspecialisttec nicians/ expertsin‘howtp rform’localsyntaxa d situations.
e.g.,Thetrainingofn tural-historicint rp eters thenuancesoflocal/h ststorylin .
9CULTUREBROKERThetwo-waylinkageork involvedtranslatingprogramsethnic communities.
e.g.rThexplanationofh althservicestloc l groupandtheexplanationofloc lhealthpr ctices
togovernment.
e.g.,Thexplanationofanew(ext rnallyiniti ted) cultural-tourismprogramtalocalg oupnd conveyancebackfgroupc er s.
10EXPERTWITNESSThepresentationand elucidationofthn cviewsaleg lr jurisdictionalproceedi gs.
e.g.,Theprovisionfdi ecttestim nyatlandus
/ownershiphearing.
e.g.,Theprovisionoftestim nynmatt rs proprietaryownershipfatr ditionaldg up.
11PUBLICARTICIPATIONSPE AL STThe occasionalgatheringsandcommunicationf groupviewsonexternalproject .
e.g.,Theinvolvementrvmanagemenf publicmeetingsohealth/w lfaresocialt er onacasebysis.
e.g.,Thepreparationofubl cpiniona traditionalorheritagematterfwide iuse.
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SOURCE:AdaptedfromvanWillig n1986:3-6.
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applied anthropological research — not just an inherent or internal advance in disciplinary prowess by field
anthropologists.
Postwar, applied anthropology has been utilized in a widening pool of public affairs areas with
Stewart’s (1961) study being a noted examination of its use in ethnohistory. Conceivably, its use will
continue to reproduce in areas of public affairs where institutions or dominant groups have advantaged
singular aspects of culture and ways-of-living at the expense of others. And for the case at hand —
involving the possibility that a state government (or that dominant sectors working through state
government) wittingly and unwittingly subjugate other ‘social truths’ with their own ‘privileged social truths’
— there is much, much scope for the deployment of applied anthropology.
Anderson (1983) has shown the ideology of statist nationalism to be one of the most dominant
and aggressive socio-political imperatives of recent world history. Kapferer (1988) notes the ‘religious
intensity’ and proselytizing urgency of many forms of contemporary nationalism. ‘Nationalist’ imaginations
intensify to become lived realities which universalize space and time and attempt to synchronize the
various individuals and groups of a ‘nation’ into an experiential unity (Anderson 1983). Modern
nationalism tends to have a ‘flat’ and ‘horizontal’ ideology, much different from the hierarchical and center-
dominant forms of statehood from previous centuries (22). Diverse cultural groups and societies have
to be tethered in ‘competitively’, and modern states are inclined to be preciously concerned about their
identities and their boundaries. Leaders / elites have tended to force and reinforce concepts of
nationhood: misfits have had to fit in! And now all of this is fodder for applied anthropologists charged
with identifying subtle societal imbalances and subtle cultural disaffections.
Van Willigen (1986) records five principal interventionist styles of practice in applied anthropology:
• Action Anthropology, a highly interactive method in which goals unfold for the given community
during its complex processes of interaction with the researcher (77);
• Research and Development a value-explicit, extended-role approach in which the researcher
assumes power (where apposite) and then devolves it (79, 91);
• Community Development a progressivist, processual approach which searches for culturally
appropriate forms of technical assistance and for opportunities to float local / host initiatives (108-
9);
• AdvocacyAnthropology a direct relationship, short-term action activity where the researcher acts
as an auxiliary to / for community leadership; and,
• Cultural Brokerage: a ‘go-between’, co-cultural effort at mediation in which the researcher works
behind the scenes (rather than ‘up front’ / ‘on stage’) to improve the cultural appropriateness of
provided services and / or the resource base with which the community / ies act (139).
Of the five, the last two (Advocacy Anthropology and Cultural Brokerage are thought to be best
suited for the involved living experiences and socio-political entanglements of urban-industrial
environments (xvi) — as per the ongoing catalyst study of culture identification / disidentification in Texas.
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In each, however, it is the responsibility of the individual researchers, for the most part, ‘to seek and
accept’ the role of part-time policymaker under the overall strategy of utilizing the products of his / her
research (Gilbert 1989:72). And that same single researcher must recognize the necessary cumulative
/ protracted rather than overnight / immediate profile of his / her deliberations (72). For such public-affairs
advocacy, the sine qua non of investigative formats is short-term research: but the sine qua non for
generative success in transforming social reality is commitment to the long-haul program of brokerage and
training effort (Cohen 1989:315).
To sum up this subsection on the related inquiries in anthropology into the state administration
of heritage, the weight of ethnographic investigation has been placed upon experimentation in value-
explicit forms of research which are ostensibly (but not exclusively) geared towards advocacy and
action. A great variety — and a steadily additive mix — of styles and techniques of applied approaches
to the discipline are currently being piloted. They are largely being developed in accordance with the
pragmatic - democratic aim to help subdued / suppressed cultures (chiefly) persist, and to encourage a
more informed and compatible adaptation to changing times. In each, the researching anthropologistmust
take pains to determine where convenient and germane community action is possible: He / she is
therefore located at both the productive and the utilizing ends of policy research enterprise (van Willigen
1986:xvii).
The lesson in current work in applied anthropology is that forms of research (where means and
ends are independent) can become accepted as bona fide. Such techniques can succeed, notably where
there is a pronounced collision of interests within an overarching society, or where there is an imperative
to recognize in a given region / state / nation a pluriverse of ‘cultures’ or ‘identities’.
Undoubtedly — as is so important for the current study of petty and opaque power in Texas —
the ‘nationalist’ ideology of a state can create or at least accelerate the circumstances in which the
disidentifying or equalizing work of applied anthropologists is in demand. As cultures, identities and socio¬
political affiliations become totalized or remain selective and / or subjugatory, so the need for the
countervailing value-stated investigations of applied anthropological research will be called for.
‘Nationalism’, in its most general sense can be seen not so much "[exploiting the] collective senses of
identity or building upon shared meanings ... as creating and generating them" (Kapferer 1989:191).
Statist nationalism, administrative nationalism, and constructive nationalism, can each devastate cultural
processes where they seek to cultivate extreme forms of cultural and / or socio-political self-
consciousness (192-193). And as confident and dominant administrations — or confident and dominant
elites working with or through administrations — privilege some heritage truths over others, a subsequent
critical and corrective role for applied researchers is spawned. Yet "it is clear that the needs, interests,
and purposes of culturally and otherwise dominant members of a [state or] community do not exclusively
or totally determine which [cultural forms, works and identifications] survive1' (Smith 1983:30). One
common ‘folklore’ can out-compete or endure, beyond another: common folklores’ can shift the
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dominance amongst cultures and social practices which ultimately may or will need to be equalized.
There are no shortages of the kind of socio-cultural and / or socio-political disharmonies that applied
research will now be summoned to investigate and help solve — and one may expect that such calls will
increasingly be issued over heritage matters alone or in concert with other public concerns.
Applied anthropology is thereby leading the way in showing how in-situ research can be used
to help solve significant problems in human affairs, where the knowledge created can be geared towards
policy-relevant diliberations and grounded action (Weber 1984:216). In such instances, researchers
become involved in the participatory exercise of moral and political values (Cohen 1989:305), and their
activities do not cease with the production or conveyance of data --- they convey themselves with the
data. In this sense, the literature informs that applied anthropological research — to become effective
— crucially becomes a daily and an ongoing pursuit (Weber 1984:221). Thus where ‘Foucauldian’
institutional arrangements exist — that is, where given administrators work in professionally petty and
occupationally opaque, capillary situations, applied anthropologists (and other applied researchers) can
it seems work profitably but at length to understand the embedded logic of the situation. Where the gaze
of administrators over human affairs in general, or towards heritage affairs in particular, may be expected
to be aggregative, the reciprocal / related work of applied researchers (in translating anthropology — or
any social science — into policy development and into policy implementation) may also be expected to
be cumulative (Cohen 1989:315). Administrative decisions gain their weight additively: advocation and
brokerage, in research, also influence additively.
2.3.5 Related Researchers
The purpose of this subsection (2.3.5) is to gain insight on lead anthropologists for the current
study of social and political discourse on truth concerning historical tourism in Texas. The insight will be
gleaned from a study of what certain leading contemporary anthropologists actually do — not just what
they say they do. Hence this subsection will explore the way prominent anthropologists conduct their
fieldwork.
In focussing upon fieldwork the subsection will first attempt to relate the contemporary fieldwork
practices selected to the intelligence so far gathered (in subsections 2.3.1 to 2.3.4) about anthropological
orientations to discourse and truth. Then it will compare the non-positivist working regimes of Clifford
Geertz and James Clifford. They are selected because their respective ethnographic careers conceivably
best reflect the epistemological and methodological issues currently brewing in and around this adjuvant,
and naturalistic study of Texas. Time and space limitations prevent the opportunity of analysis being
extended to any other non-positivist anthropologists or culture theorists in ethnography.
First, then, comes the route to the two Cliffords — Geertz and "James’.
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2.3.5.1 The Principle Styles of Fieldwork in Anthropology
In anthropology there have been three predominant fieldwork practices — viz., ‘British social
anthropology’, 'the Chicago school’, and (latterly) 'the phenomenological-existential mode' (Manning
1987:11). A brief account of each now follows:
• The British School of Social Anthropology
The British Anthropological Tradition was significantly influenced by the administrative dictates
of empire, and the need for knowledge to be gained "how societies worked". Consequently, British social
anthropology was inclined to be functionalist in its methodology (Marcus and Fischer 1986:19), often
constituting a penetrative but stained inquiry into each conceivable aspect of life. In favoring close
description, the British Malinowskian tradition was essentially sympathetic in perspective (rather than
empathetic) (Wax 1972), though Douglas (1976:43) believes that its often isolated anthropologists more
commonly identified with the given people than with the discipline, with theories, or with absolute truths.
Manning (1987:12) maintains that it is British social anthropology that has provided the guidelines
upon which so much conventional fieldwork in anthropology is based:
• case-based, sympathetic work has become emic ethnography (Berreman 1966);
• administrative detail mongering has become (for British social anthropology’s most
faithful adherents, at any rate) the close attention to empirical data — but the British
tradition "has eschewed model building [and] the erection of 'ground theories’" (Manning
1987:14);
• removed, isolated investigation has become auto-didacticism (14); and,
a lone-work styles have become fieldwork by self-apprenticeship (Epstein 1967; Rock
1979:6).
British social anthropologists have historically not been strong comparativists.
* The Chicago School
In contrast to the British tradition the tendency within Chicago school research was for
anthropologists to be somehow previously associated with the groups and communities they studied.
They were prone to being investigative reporters, travellers abroad, or casual comparativists (Douglas
1976) — in short they were likely to be current, partial or former members of the target population.
Because of this added degree of immersion in the target group culture, the critical epistemological and
methodological problems concerned whether the inquirer — almost a sociologist as an anthropologist -
-- could stand aside to look ‘objectively’ at what was 'already known’ (Hughes 1971). There was less
need 1o reflect’ in order to understand an alien worldview or to cope with a removed or exotic
environment. Much could already be assumed.
Accordingly, the ongoing research agenda of the Chicago school was narrower than the British
school: it was less varied. It was generally reducible to the investigations of a 'marginal', 'empathizing'
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but alternative insider — albeit an insider with binocular vision (Manning 1987:16). But, like the British
school, Chicago-style anthropologists had to take considerable time while their ‘story’ unfolded: they had
to experiment with various methods of open / closed entry, and with full discretionary / limited-discretionary
inquiry (Wax 1952; Hunter 1960).
Understandably, the possibilities of generalized explanation across research studies in the
Chicago tradition was extensive. Overtime, the regularly harnessed conceptual platforms included,
according to Manning (1987:16):
• the theory of social disorganization (Davis 1975);
• the ecology — zone theory and culture differention (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921 ]);
• the social-psychological theories of symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969); and,
• the theories of collective behavior (Becker 1982).
Although the degree of generalization possible in such sociology-inspired anthropological work
has been low, the core work of the Chicago school is regarded as having a cultural relativist perspective
(Marcus and Fischer 1986:19).
• Existential-Phenomenology
In recent decades fieldwork in anthropology has been influenced — as has that of sociology,
psychology and other social study disciplines — by the existential issues of meaning that pertain to
internal states of being and knowing (Douglas 1976:35; Alder and Adler 1987). Existential fieldwork in
anthropology is not a search for objective truth, as Malinowskian and Chicagoan anthropology have been
inclined to be: it considers, instead, ‘the transactional relationship’ individuals have with things (Thomas
1983) or what Manning (1987:18) reproduces within the queries. ‘How does one know?’, *What can be
known?’, and ‘What sorts of Knowing are there?’
Under existential phenomenology, researchers are not intimidated by close proximity in
investigation: they favor intimacy with researched subjects and objects. The maintenance of close,
dialectical relationships permits the inquirer not only to identify what people know, but how they know it.
Singular and integrated or consensual perspectives are not sought: rather there is a keen interest in the
recognition and / or demolition of the false facades which commonly exist around communal truths.
Hence "the older [research] rules about secrecy, trust and mutual truth, the protection of one’s subjects’
worlds, and event to some extent, the editing of field reports to save the face of the researcher and the
research subjects, no longer hold" (Manning 1987:19).
Hence, the goals of existential-cum-phenomenalogical fieldwork in anthropology have been
nominated as:
• the effort to find new views of truth and / or human feeling (19);
• the endeavor to observe everyday life in natural settings, using the natural data
sources (e.g., diaries, in-depth interviews) of ethnoscience (Agar 1985);
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• the attempt to gain insight reflexively into the way the native sees the world — not
vicariously but analytically (Gubrium 1988:73-74); and,
• the approach to uncover the everyday reasoning of a population — the talk and the
discourse of informants who may be deliberately or purposely selected for their
marginality as for their central representativity (Johnson 1990:27-33).
And in so doing, the fieldwork of ‘new’ anthropology no longer "locks the observer inside rigid
category systems having little or nothing to do with the culture of the researched, but everything to do with
[the anthropologists own] research culture" (Van Maanen, Manning and Miller 1990:5) — as originally
quoted early on in section 1.
2.3.5.2 Geertz, Clifford and the Experimental Moment
In the last two decades anthropology has experienced such a range of revisions through its
accommodation of existential-phenomenological techniques and through its late and oxygenating
proliferation of romanticist perspectives that Rose (1990:55) is able to conclude that a sea change has
occurred in ethnographic practice. Marcus and Cushman (1982) have coined the term "the experimental
moment" for the refreshing and pioneering ways that anthropological fieldwork is now being conducted
and written up.
Geertz and Clifford have been at the forefront of this new ethnography — these vernal field
realities, both in the ways they have researched and described parts of the world unknown to others, and
in the manners in which they have used new voices / novel hands to present their findings regarding truth
in ethnography. Under Geertz, Clifford, and others, ethnography-as-science is becoming refurbished, yet
more self-regulated at the some time. And after Geertz and Clifford and others, ethnography-as-art is
becoming legitimate. These trends are now shown in brief in Table 2.3.5.2./1.
Table 2.3.5.2./1 is an attempt to contrast the non-positivist ethnographies of Geertz and Clifford.
It is based on the work of Pearce and Chen (1989) who have closely examined the way that both Geertz
and Clifford reject the possibility of detached, neutral, unbiased and objective scientific discourse — that
is, knowledge "untouched by human minds" (119). it traces how Geertz and Clifford both see and use
ethnography as a sermonic exercise — a rhetorical activity. The table is designed as an attempt to reflect
the characterizations by Pearce and Chen that "Geertz [is] an accomplished novelist whose hard work
is deliberately obscured by the grace of the finished product; and [that] Clifford ([is] a [campus-bound but
particularly insightful] commentator on the problems of representation in [ethnographic] writing" (123).
Table 2.3.5.2./1 introduces Geertz as a master of hermeneutics — an interpreter who does not
think it possible for cultural analysis to be an experimental science, and who advances by "construing
social expressions [out of] their surface enigmatical" (Geertz 1973:45). The table breaks down some of
the key features of the Geertzian approach to the dialetics of experience, an approach based on the thick
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description of 'experience-near' and 'experience far' conceptualizations (Pearce and Chen 1989:121). Yet
the table fails if it conveys the impression that the substantive Geertzian detail inherent in thick description
is merely added or padded text. Geertz was, himself, particularly brusque about the inadequately
voluminous ethnography of Malinowski — whose output, he believed, was "detailed and comprehensive
to the point of indiscriminateness" (127).
In contrast to the portrayal of Geertz, the table does not present Clifford as a decoder of
textualized behavior, but as an ethnographer who is keen to reveal the necessarily polyphonic character
of ethnography. Clifford is a surrealist in attitude: he sees culture as something 'constructed artificially’
rather than existing transparently. And, as Table 2.3.5./2 also suggests, Clifford is Bakhtinian in his
support of the concept of the heterogiossia: "languages [and cultures] do not exclude each other, but
rather intersect with each other in many different ways" (Clifford 1983). Thus Clifford believes that it is
not an easymatter to ever isolate a distinct society, cultures are inescapably influenced by the constant
availability of other beliefs, values and social arrangements, and the interpretations that are accessible
to ethnographers are always contested. Interpretations of reality are only truths "espoused by parties with
different situations of power relative to one another" (Marcus and Fischer [on Clifford] 1986:123).
Hence Table 2.3.5.2./1 presents the non-positivist and the existentialist-phenomenological views
of Geertz as non-literal carefully translated interpretations of truth, while the non-positivist and the
existentialist-phenomenalogical outlook of Clifford is offered as the endeavor to painstakingly capture
plurality through sustained indigenous collaboration. And the work of both (as is implicit rather than
explicit in the table) is shown to reactive against existing forms of positivist or inadequate non-positivist
ethnography which are conceived improperly around ad hoc problem selection and around inconsistent
role relationships. Both Geertz and Clifford, in their separate ways, speak rhetorically against the gross
counterfactualities and the largely unsuspected intentionality of so much other ethnography. They both
say much about the persistent ways that ethnographers must be vigilant against the creep of intellectual
imperialism into their anthropology. They not only "argue that translation / interlocution are possible, but
that there is a moral imperative why they should occur" (Pearce and Chen 1989:128). They therefore
offer stern advocacy on the methodological and conceptual reasoning that ought to be part of all sincere
attempts to establish felicitous conditions for ethnography — whatever the parent discipline for that
ethnography. Their rhetoric and their praxis is in the van of the experimental moment of all ethnography.
2.3.6 Related Perspectives
This subsection is designed to pull together a number of contemporary perspectives which have
risen with the claimed ‘change in sea level’ in anthropological understanding in the 1970s and 1980s. The
ten selected perspectives are drawn variously from their various influences with the increasingly important
currents of thought in ethnography that have so far been aired in subsections 2.3.1 to 2.3.5, viz.
from the rise of romanticist thought,
from the late popularity and operational appeal of applied anthropology and,
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from the effervescence within the discipline that is caught up in the emergence of
existential, phenomenalogical, surrealist and / or transactional ethnography ( — much
of which, but not all, may be assumed within the romanticist movement).
The ten perspectives which follow, potentially offer new and catalytic insight for inquiry into the dominance
/subjugation issues involved in the manufacture of state heritage. Oncemore, however, it should be noted
that there will be some considerable overlap between some or other(s) of these perspectives.
* Cultural Action as a Mix of Rationalities
The opening perspective is an important foundational one, and warrants clear restatement. The
emergent vision in anthropology is comparative, but the new global aspect within the discipline is "no
longer framed by an evolutionary scheme or oriented to the measurement of relative progress toward
‘rational’ values [alone]" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:23). Anthropology now operates via "a looser set of
genre conventions" (23) which are altogether more ethnographically realist (Marcus and Cushman 1982).
The contemporary perspective in anthropology is more realist in that "it seeks to represent the reality of
a whole world' (Marcus and Fischer 1986:23; emphasis added) of rationalities, irrationalities, arationalities
and non-rationalities. Anthropology is not just discovering peoples of the world, it is constantly
rediscovering them.
• Society as Informal Order
In the 1990s, so much of the cultural analysis that occurred before the 1970s is just not
believable anymore. So much of the twentieth century anthropology has been deluded in its ultra¬
coherency: depictions of formal order have been just too ‘impeccable’ (Geertz 1973:18). Existence has
been seen on stainless and indefectible. "Pressure to get to the heart of culture has introduced into the
field of anthropology a systematic bias which carries it ever further away from its subject: namely a bias
which favors conservative, particularistic versions of culture, and which denies the creative activities that
occur on the fringes of all cultures" (MacConnell 1979:149).
Recent perspectives in the discipline of anthropology have become Whorfian (after Whorf 1956):
there are no frozen, coherent realities, the object world is a kaleidoscope which must be organized by the
minds of researchers (as it is in life, by inhabitants). ‘Old’ anthropology had been biased toward over-
thematization, not so much in the way [anthropologists] thought about cultural materials but rather in the
kinds of places anthropologists were willing to move into and stay at for a while (Levy, cited in Shweder
1984:19). "The sample of cultures studied by anthropologists is a very strong sample [which] we have
never adequately defined, and it may overrepresent cultures that are tightly organized" (19).
‘Old’ anthropology had ben platformed too restrictively upon "the Western conception of the
person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic
center of awareness, emotion, judgement and action organized into a distinctive whole" (Geertz 1975:48).
And that is increasingly appearing to be “a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures"
(48) and even within the particular setting of Western societies, themselves. Californian culture, for
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instance, is now being seen as "a zero-point culture [to which] no one belongs [and where] there is no
[native culture’" (Manning 1987:17).
Hence the emergent perspectives of the ‘new’ anthropology (which jostles with surviving 'old'
viewpoints) no longer axiomatically support the image of an unitary world. ‘Innocent eye' classifications
(where things are classified because that is the way they are) are increasingly rejected (Shweder
1984:45). Reason can no longer be seen to dictate absolutely in the groups and societies encountered
by ethnographers. After the sea-change, formal order is conjoined by informal order: culture has also
been found to be an extralogical, arbitrary partitioning of the world (45). When formality and rule are now
found by a rising proportion of anthropologists, a new healthy tendency is for the investigator to suspect
that he / she has evoked Procrustean laws of analysis. Many more ethnographers now doubt coherency:
as Foucault (1970:xix) recognized elsewhere, cohesion and indivisibility smack of an a priori imposition
by science on society.
• Culture as Diversity
The ever common divisions between older evolutionary / functionalist / cultural materialist
perspectives in anthropology and the newer romanticist / existentialist perspectives can also be examined
from the point of view of cultural variability, as well as that of societal coherence:
At one pole of opinion are the reductionists — Marxists, neoclassical economists,
cultural materialists, orthodox Freudians, and sociobiologists — whose basic premises
include uniformities of structure and content in human life, culture and motivation at all
times and places. They are inclined to minimize cultural variability and to interpret
evidence of variations as surface manifestations, concealing the deeper uniformities
forecast by their theoretical positions. At the other pole are those cultural
phenomenologists who insist on the uniqueness of each culture as the symbolism of
a people who share a history and endow each aspect of human life that appears
universal with a unique pattern of meanings derived from that history. They tend to
reject transcultural categories and even comparative methods as [being] based on
superficial similarities in behavior that fail to take account of diversity in the meanings
that define culture (Le Vine 1984:80).
Yet as the division persists, the urges and exigencies of ‘new’ anthropology have reduced the level of
support within the discipline for the reductionist argument. What Kroeber formerly called the centrifugal
impulse of anthropology (Geertz 1984:265) is now slowly being broken down in terms of the regard for
cultural diversity.
In response to the ascendent phenomenological viewpoint, reductionists (and a number of other
social commentators) argue that developments in the mass media, in the physical sciences and in
technology, are or will all lead to the world "becoming a more homogenous, integrated and interdependent
place" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:135), where the different, the unusual and the exotic will slowly
disappear. But experiential and existential ethnographers strongly challenge that view: "the apparent
increasing global integration suggests [to them] not the elimination of cultural diversity, but rather
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opportunities tor counterpoising diverse alternatives that nonetheless share a common world" (136). The
debate continues: the perspectives continue to clash over the extent of homogeneity in culture.
• Culture as Everything
The fourth perspective concerns the way in which culture is nowadays found to be ‘larger’.
Culture is not so much felt to be expanding, it is merely being seen by existentialist anthropologists to be
even more actopoidal than was suspected before. Learnt or shared cultural constructions — i.e., those
held within one cultural group rather than another — are being identified in an immense plethora of novel
places and situations.
Reading has, for instance, been found to be a socially constructed part of culture, in which "what
people actually do, the interpretations they produce, are attached to everything outside themselves, to the
whole of their social and material world" (Pratt 1982-3:222).
Similarly, the ontological ground of the ideology of a culture / of a society is being identified on
much wider fronts. The articulations of ideological and cultural premises are being uncovered in realms
of experience which were previously felt to have just not been ideological or cultural matters (Kapferer
1989:191). Thus nationalism — as a motivational force within ideology and culture — has for instance
been found to not "exploit collective senses of identity or [to] build upon shared meanings so much as [to]
create and generate them" (191).
And, in studying cultural ritual, Myeroff (1982:112) has found that cultural rites-of-passage are
"often merged with [wider cosmological] messages and [wider social] occasions that go beyond the
change of status of an individual or age cohort." Symbolic identification in culture are thus found almost
everywhere: cultural representations integrate and socialize in so many more places, moments and
situations than was formerly deemed probable.
In the light of this expansion of awareness about the force of the presence of cultural
imperatives, Bourdieu has found taste to be strongly rhetorical in terms of cultural meaning — that is,
strongly determined by class or group persuasions:
A cultural product — an avant-garde picture, a political manifesto, a newspaper — is
a constituted taste, a taste that has been raised from the vague semi-existence of
half-formulated or unformulated experience, implicit or even unconscious desire, to the
full reality of the finished product, by a process of objectification .... It is consequently
charged with the legitimizing, reinforcing capacity which objectification always
possesses, especially when, as is the case now, the logic of structural homologies
assigns it to the prestigious group so that it functions as a authority which authorizes
and reinforces dispositions by giving them a collectively recognized expression
(Bourdieu 1984:231).
Hence to Bourdieu, taste is not so much a matter of individual choice, but a matter of valued and
conspicuous meaning: it is part of the articulated rhetoric of a group or subculture. Taste is part of
socially determined meaning and is held within what Fish (1980:322) called different interpreting
communities within a society.
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• Culture as Dialect
Most, if not all, anthropologists do not believe that people move around in a raw universe (Smith
1983:22). Most, if not all, anthropologists — particularly interpretivists — believe that the cultures in which
people live are interpreted ones rather than being aseptic, untouched inheritances: "Cultures as collective
organizations of ideas, symbols and meanings do not... come internally packaged ...." (Le Vine 1984:82).
The values held by people are not a naked or "an inherent property of objects nor [are they a] self-evident
projection of subjects" (Smith 1983:11), they are the outcome of the techno-economic dynamics of the
host culture. Anthropologists and culture theorists, today, are not inclined to view culture as a natural
structure or entity "in the way that a geological function is natural" it can never be authentic" (MacConnell
1979:153).
Anthropologists today are increasingly drawn towards the romantic notion that cultures are
arbitrary codes (D'Andrade and Romney 1964), that is cultural logics and dialects which have to be learnt.
They are constructions of the world which constantly change, and continually question (and frequently
reverse) understandings and meanings overtime. Thus the cultural dialects are inescapably dialectical.
Individuals living within the particular society have to learn how to interpret them: anthropologists on the
outside have to learn how to interpret and reinterpret them. Hence interpretations will always be
incomplete in themselves and inconsistent amongst each other, and will always tend "to escape from
systematic modes of assessment' (Geertz 1973:24).
• Identity as Uncertain Self
The next perspective in anthropology flows on from the last one. Ethnographers are, in the
West, critically concerned today with the cultures people choose to belong to — or choose to experiment
with. As ethnography revitalizes itself, it has to confront the immense sociological boundary changes of
late twentieth century life, and (particularly in the U.S.A.) it has to accommodate the new varied cultural
and ethnic forms of American pluralism. "For many Americans, questions of group mobility or assimilation
are no longer burning issues, or are easily identified" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:155). Old, traditional,
compelling group / state / national loyalties may no longer be so obsessive. The basis of new /
contemporary / postmodern affinities is increasingly obscure. Cultural belongingness is become
deristricted: are the motivations of cultural group membership for a given individual ethnic, emotional or
capricious?
Sense-of-self is changing in the U.S.A. What Geertz (1973:258) calls the ‘gross actualities of
blood, race, language, locality, religion and tradition' still remain, but there is a conjoint acceleration of
imaginative personship and of quixotic nominalism.
Sense of belonging is variously becoming more diverse, more uncertain and less fixed. To recall
Myeroff (1982:298), "American festive occasions are more often, [nowadays], celebrations of an
individuals’ birth, marriage, divorce, or death, rather than communal recognitions of the importance of
communitas ... ." In complex societies, overall, "a person's social identities are [nowadays] not only
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numerous but often conflicting, and there Is no clear hierarchy of loyalties that makes one identity
dominant over the others" (Kopytoff 1986:89).
• Culture as a Mental Act
To Hanson and Martin (1973:191) the central perspective or philosophical concern of
anthropology, is the orientation and necessity to understand the categories of thought of different cultures.
Anthropology could be said, then, to be the disciplinary effort to make comprehensible the basic modes
of thought and categorical conceptualization of other societies. To Ryle (1949), culture theorists should
apply themselves to "the concept of the mind" — where the mind is not a hidden, inner theater of private
contemplation, but a public arena performing overt acts (50-1). To Ryle (and later to Geertz (1973))
mental activities are open to public view: mental acts are public thinking — they are knowing how
(Ryle 1949:54). And contemporary anthropologists who follow Ryle and Geertz see social thought as an
internalized system of public behavior, not a confidential, secluded, yet explicit matter of ratiocination.
Culture then may be seen in this style of hermeneutics as a set of mental acts which are largely guided
by subconscious levels of reasoning.
• Culture as Symbolic Meaning
The insights of Ryle, Geertz, Clifford have shifted the attention in anthropology from ‘hard’
behavior, ipso facto, to 'soft' mentality --- to symbols and to meaning. The scrutiny has turned from
behavior as social structure towards valued expression (Marcus and Fischer 1986:33), and the perfidities
of communities of spirit have become more significant to ethnographers than the formal fixities of the
known elements and certain compounds of society (Abrahams 1982:163).
Hence to Geertz, (1973:33) the politics of anthropological perception is not a matter of the
definition and verification of societies ‘physical’ structures, it is a matter of how to appropriately frame an
analysis of meaning for the given society. It is the quest to understand ‘shared flow’, ‘communitas’,
‘liminal activity’ (Turner 1982:29), not just at moments of celebration, but for ordinary and enduring ways
of living, too. It is the effort to comprehend the fluidity rather than the fixity of group belonging and group
thought: the identification of the way communities and societies demarcate behavior for particular (i.e.,
limited) times and places (28). And as the romanticist rebellion continues (Shweder 1984:45), it is
increasingly targeted upon ‘expressive’ acts, ‘symbolic behaviors’, and ‘non-verbal’ unities.
• Culture as Local Meaning
The penultimate of these recap outlooks revolves around the fact that routinely the anthropologist
is a novice in the ‘new’ or ‘removed’ society he / she is exploring. This is the problem of 'other cultures’
(Hanson and Martin 1973:205-6). The anthropologists perspective is usually one of the outsider,
therefore: his / her perspective is that of the interested observer who wants to gain an ‘internal’ / ‘insider’
understanding of the native’s viewpoint. Hence romanticist anthropologists are keen "to see things from
the actor’s point of view" (Geertz 1973:14): to interpret via emic analysis.
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The main problem with the emic perspective is that the anthropologist can never be sure he has
captured it (Hanson and Martin 1973:193). Harris, (1980) moreover, considers it insufficient to just try and
grasp emic understanding — for each and every society must also act in etic fashion. The need to
subsist necessitates an etic behavioral mode ofproduction (51); the impulse to survive necessitates an
etic behavioral mode of reproduction (51); and the drive to produce / to manufacture / to engage-in-
technical-activity necessitates both an etic behavioral domestic economy and an etic behavioral political
economy (52). Hence it may be more appropriate to detail this perspective as the local / grounded /
situational perspective rather than the perhaps constrained ‘emic’ or ‘verstehen’ outlook. In toto, it
amounts to the comprehensive perspective that has to be gauged, not just the insider's view on insider
matters, per se.
• Anthropology as Reflexivity
The final summary perspective in anthropology is that of reflexivity. Anthropologists studying
‘other cultures’ must not forget or overlook the inescapably imperfect nature of their textualization. When
Western anthropologists study ‘other’ cultures, the examination is inevitably conducted within an
embedded Western world of values. Too much cross-cultural togetherness can be assumed too early:
fieldworkers must remain alert to the almost natural degree to which his / her "shaky control of material"
is later replaced and concealed by authorial writing (Marcus and Fischer 1986:69). Hence Dwyer (1982)
constantly stresses the need for ethnographers to be vigilant to the way their knowledge grows: he urges
recursiveness from one interview to the next. Accordingly, for Dwyer, "the text is meant to be neither
definitive nor a model for others to follow, but rather a way of stressing the vulnerability of all participants
in the ethnographic project: anthropologist, informant and reader" (Marcus and Fischer [on Dwyer]
1986:70).
2.3.7 Related Concepts
In this subsection clarification will be given for a number of important concepts in anthropology
which have a bearing on dominance and subjugation.
• Culture
Culture is the cardinal concept of anthropology, though it is an omnibus term and there is a
multipolicity of definitions of the subject (Kroeber and Kluckholn 1952). Generally, definitions of culture
concern "those phenomena which account for patterns of behaving which cannot be fully explained by
psychobiological concepts" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:2). And, for the purposes of this study, that is
aptly conveyed by Goodenough’s (1964:36) judgement whereby culture consists of "whatever it is one has
to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role
that they accept for one of themselves." Thus, to anthropologists culture is routinely regarded as a set
of shared social codes and conceptualizations.
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• Texts
For many anthropologists, the term culture is just too comprehensive in its coverage (Kaplan and
Manners 1972:3), and an increasing number of anthropologists prefer to work with particular concepts of
social knowledge rather than with the blanket and compendious term ‘culture’ (Douglas 1976). Thus,
where structualists in anthropology tended to be more concerned with the relations between the mutually
conditioning components of a given cultural code, more recent, interpretive anthropologists have focused
more keenly on culture as a range of social knowledges which are principally built around the different
meanings held by different populations and / or groups or sections of populations and / or groups (Marcus
and Fischer 1986:25). Put another way, structuralist explanations of culture were geared to the encoding
of knowledge about singular, special or privileged subjects, i.e., to understanding the way elements of a
culture contributed to the working order of the society in question, whereas an interpretive anthropology
like Geertzian ‘cultural hermeneutics’ (Geertz 1983:4) concentrates its attention on meaningful content in
its own right: there, no subjects are fixed, given or transcendental.
Interpretive anthropologists regard the meanings that are held by social groups as being multiple
and changeable. Since subjects are neither durable nor autonomous, it is therefore deemed necessary
to identify the convertible and labile meanings held about them in texts, which (as was presented in
subsection 2.3.5) has to be appropriately translated and thickly described by the ethnographer, (according
to Geertz), and which has to be collaboratively produced by informant and researcher, (according to
Clifford).
The interpretive approach of both Geertz and Clifford are semiotic in approach, however. As is
so for other interpretive anthropologists, the text is produced as a statement which offers elucidation: it
yields ‘comments about’ rather than ‘strict codes for5 the understanding being revealed. The semiotic
interpretation of texts enables the reader to converse with the people being studied, and it yields insight
into the cherished meanings and pliant significances they variously hold.
But again, for Geertz the text is evident in a population’s transient form of shaped behavior,
cultural activities and patterns of symbols while for Clifford the texts are specifically produced for the
ethnographic event rather than being self-manifest (Pearce and Chen 1989:125).
• Discourse
Discursive analysis is that broad branch of social science in which social theorists study "how
members [of a given society] interpret behavior and display (supposed) internal states for all to see, [i.e.,]
how members make behavior meaningful to one another (Bilmes 1986:4). Although the fields impetus
had tended to be loosely sociological rather than strictly anthropological, anthropologists have drawn
concepts from a wide socio-scientific literature, notably from:
• Foucault’s discursive approach to history;
• Wittgenstein, Austin, Grice on linguistic philosophy;
• Meed, Blumer and Goffman on symbolic interactionism;
• Birdwhisteli, Hall and Scheflen on nonverbal communication; and,
• Bateson, Hymes, Labov, Sacks and Schegloff on communication analysis (4-5).
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Taken together, the above fifteen discourse analysts (sometimes otherwise styled as linguistic
pragmatists) have studied "the relation of utterances to their linguistic and nonlinguistic contexts" (126).
In order to explain how the concept of discourse has been applied to anthropology, a brief
explanation will be given to Undstrom’s (1990) adaptation of Foucault’s genealogical discourse --- an
approach in which Lindstrom (15) attempts to translate Foucault’s work from heavily textualized aspects
of European knowledge to a remote South Pacific society which is largely non-textualizing in its own
practices.
Lindstrom suggests that the post-structuralist term ‘discourse’ has in fact replaced ‘culture’ in
many anthropological arenas (xii). Culture, though a neutral term is deemed to be unable to address the
various conditions in which various competing bodies of knowledge are formed. In exploring Tanna (an
island of southern Vanuatu --- formerly the New Hebrides), Lindstrom finds that the society under analysis
is an island world of discourse (28) where discourse is taken to be "the complexes of signs and practices
which organize social existence and social reproduction" (Terdiman 1985:54). Consequently, Lindstrom’s
(1990:xi) recasting of Foucault’s theses is an anthropological attempt to penetrate the local discursive
order rather than to map the cultural geography or cultural contexts of the island.
In analyzing the domination and the subjectification of ‘those who talk’, Lindstrom identifies a mix
of discursive and non-discursive processes and situations which channel the creation, use and digestion
of what he terms knowledge statements (or otherwise truth statements). In following Foucault’s
genealogical thinking, Lindstrom suggests that these knowledge / truth statementsmaintain orders of truth
and power within each or the given society (12). To him, "culture is always freighted with interests.
Everywhere there is inequality of access to the means of cultural knowledge production [as represented
by these knowledge / truth statements]" (12).
Given the continuing existence of these social inequalities, Lindstrom follows Foucault (1981:67)
in conceiving discourse as the violence that people within a society do to things as they impose their
beliefs and rationalities upon them, and also as they repress alternative cultural knowledges. Culture then
becomes a view of the world that people learn within groups and sustain in ‘the shared talk’ that
constitutes discourse. And in this regard, it is not only urban-industrial / metropolitan / Western society
that may be conceived as ‘an information society1 — for Tanna itself is so rich in its articulation of
discourse, that it too would qualify for the term. Tanna, it appears, is a worldspace redolent with
information production, storage, circulation and consumption of talk (read ‘information’) (Lindstrom
1990:10).
In this regard may be seen one anthropologist’s contempualization of the merit of the
Foucauldian theses on knowledge and power for the understanding of social cohesion on an isolated
Oceanic island. Yet, Lindstrom does not claim his insight — in this instance — to be ethnographic (8),
ipso facto, for it lacks transcendental subjects. Such is Lindstrom’s own concept of ethnography. The
subject will be returned to in greater detail in section 2.6 on communications.
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• Regimes of Value and Truth
The fourth concept that warrants amplification, is Appadurai’s (1986:4) thinking on regimes of
value — viz., these particular conditions under which economic objects circulate differentially in space
and time. A regime of value exists where an exchange situation, either inter- or intracultural, is typified
by a relatively shallow set of shared standards of value (14). When privileged, periodic events take place
free from the norms of a society's economic life, a status-bestowing tournament of value is thought to
occur (21).
Yet, if Lindstrom’s accentuation of Foucault’s ideas are supported, neither the concept of
regimes-of-value nor tournaments-of-value should be limited to economic matters. Discourse is itself
thought to be marketable: knowledge statements / truth statements do not so much have had use value
or truth value in and of themselves — they have potential exchange values (Lindstrom 1990:22). Whether
they are written down, or orally produced, knowledge statements / truth statements are exchangeable and
consumable.
In this regard discourse may be judged to be disciplinal or doctrinal knowledge, and groups in
society contest against others to gain or to sustain a hegemony over contrary bodies of knowledge, where
their favored regime of truth is rendered universal. Disciplinary knowledge is that set of rules and
procedures which govern knowledge production (Foucault 1981:61; Bourdieu 1977:657). Doctrinal
knowledge is binding and enunciatory socially distributed knowledge; it tends to be ‘strongly political’
(Foucault 1981:64; Lindstrom 1990:51), but is only of value if it is "talked about and deployed within the
society" (37). For the South Pacific island of Tanna, Lindstrom concluded that knowledge statements /
truth statements are not a distinct form of exclusively epistemological way of knowing within society, but
are well entwined with all / everyday island discourse (43). On Tanna, knowledge is not so much
uncovered or created: it is socially revealed. By Lindstrom’s account the value of disciplinary or doctrinal
truths on Tanna is passed downwithin social groups, not made up by particularly intelligent persons (43).
This local theory of knowing — and thereby this local theory of the value of knowledge on Tanna — is
more a matter of social perception than of intellectual apperception (43).
• Webs of Significance
Interpretive anthropologists tend to follow Weberian views of society: they believe humans are
"suspended in webs of significance that they themselves have spun" (Geertz 1973:5). For Geertz those
webs are explicitly the culture that groups uphold and share. For Lindstrom the webs are implicitly the
discourse they participate in. But for both Geertz and Lindstrom, the crucial endeavor is to search for the
meanings that flow through that identified culture or that identified discourse.
Both culture and discourse are conceived of as public meaning in interpretivist / hermeneutic
anthropology. Culture (for Geertz) and discourse (for Lindstrom, after Foucault) are interworked modes
of communication — shared and responsive systems of significant and indicative ‘signs’. And to
understand or map these webs of significance, the interpretive anthropologist must gauge context. In
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culture and in discourse, people in a given intersubjective setting, group, or community engage in the
traffic of symbolism as they conjointly experience life situations or socially experience things. Webs of
significance are thereby the social and public human thoughts which are in circulation about life and
about things.
• Ernies and Etics
Further comment is warranted on the terms emic and etic which have occurred with some
frequency in section 1 and section 2.3. The two, largely oppositional terms stand as crucial guideposts
for ethnographers and other researchers in the humanities who deal in cultures apart from their own:
"Many anthropologists, in fact, if not other social scientists, may owe their jobs to their ability to make the
distinction between ‘emic’ and ‘etic’" (Headland 1990:17). Unfortunately, many ethnographers and social
scientists utilize the two concepts somewhat vaguely in their diverse purposes (18), sometimes loosely
equating emic and etic "with verbal versus nonverbal, or as specific versus universal, or as interview
versus observation, or as subjective knowledge versus scientific knowledge" (21). Usage remains
somewhat problematic in anthropology.
Pike — who first coined the two terms (see Pike 1967) — accepts Kant’s (1966:70) view that
"We can attain to a knowledge of appearances only, never to that of the things in themselves". Hence
Pike is concerned to see how a thing relates to the thought and knowledge of a people. To him an emic
unit "is a physical or mental item or system treated by insiders as relevant to their system of behavior"
(Pike 1990/A:28). To him emic units are locatable in the patterned cultural-contexts of mental-plus-
physical behavior. They may be observed or deduced in implicit or explicit fashion and they cover the
territory between ‘ideas’ and ‘things’ and / or between ‘speech’ and ‘experience’. And of special
importance to Pike, is the tagmeme (30) which is that particular type of emic unit which relates to
paradagmatic, the syntagmatic, the pragmatic, and the cohesive routines a group / community / society
live and think by.
Harris (1990/A:60), however, is not easily able to accept constructions (or rather, in his eyes,
reconstructions) made exclusively from emic components. To him, reconstructions of mental life have
necessarily to be etic (not emic) and their correspondence with the supposed emic structures operating
(or believed by others like Pike to operate in a society or community) must always remain untestable.
In the estimation of Harris (59) the larger the community or social scene, the less it is likely that identified
issues can be accounted for by ‘emically valid intentions’.
But Harris does not wish to destroy or designate the distinction between emic and etic
understanding. He wishes to point out that in his view science cannot progress very far on emic accounts
only. To him, etic accounts are needed when prediction or retrodiction is required, or when a study must
examine a behavior over a considerable span of time.
Harris recognizes, however, that there are no comfortable alternatives to the emic / etic
distinction. Subjective / objective distinctions are difficult to use because participants can be both
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subjective and objective, as can observers. Insider / outsider points of view are difficult to use because
outside (researchers) are not necessarily only observers or always outsiders. Cognized / operational
distinctions are difficult to use (where the cognized model of the environment is that conceived by the
people who act in it and the operational model is that constructed by the anthropologist) are difficult to
use because "of the lack of specificity concerning how one knows about the cognized model as conceived
by the actor" (Harris 1990/A:51). And mental / behavioral differences are difficult to use because of the
ambiguities involved in determining whether it is the participant's or the observer's judgement of what the
participants think that is being deployed.
The debate on the emic / etic distinction continues in anthropology and in the humanities. Pike
(1990/B) maintains etic / outsider / research criteria need not only or predominantly be used in science
because natives can always / eventually be taught to use external / etic criteria of analysis once they have
been translated to their own language / thought regimes. And Harris continues to believe that emic-only
‘closed-hermeneutic circles’ of understanding are unproductive because they do not help one understand
the way a society has inherently to deal with the environment and nature surrounding it. That, to Harris
(1990/B:83), is importantly, largely an empirical matter, not restrictively an epistemological one.
• The Social Life of Commodities
Ethnographers conceptualize that there is an anthropology to things. Events / things /
commodities are held have social lives (Appadurai 1986:3). Within each identifiable social and / or
political economy there is a commodity ecumene 927) in which happenings / ideas / objectives are
accorded a cultural role 935) specific to that group / community / society. Hence the primary value of
events / things / commodities is their use as rhetorical signs — otherwise known as social or incarnated
signs (38). 'Trade' occurs in these commodities in mundane everyday situations, or otherwise in the
forementioned tournaments of value when the said events / things / commodities are nonroutine.
• Singularlzation
Interpretivist anthropologists do not only take their key concepts from interpretive / Weberian
analysis. Some concepts have also been borrowed from established / structuralist analysis. From the
traditional functional theory of Durkheim, comes important insights into the understanding of ‘religion’ in
its broadest social and political contexts. Religion helps build social consensus: religion reinforces
common values and views. From Durkheim's (1976 [originally 1912]) perspective societies need to set
apart particular areas of their physical terrain as their notional social-spaces as sacred zones. From
interpretivist - anthropological perspectives, societies do set aside certain portions of their physical or
notional environment. Hence both Durkheimian foundationalists and interpretivist - anthropologists both
support the view that groups / communities / cultures seek to ensure that certain precious or esteemed
places and things remain singular. This, to Appadurai (1986:73), is the process of singularization — the
process which 'publicly precludes’ these spaces and items from being commoditized. In modern states
Appadurai believes the right to singularize an object is power-related, and at its extreme levels,
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monarchies / elites / leaders can establish a monopoly over a select set of objects (73) to symbolically
represent the power, dignity and integrity of that statist or local communality. Hence interpretivist
anthropologists put considerable importance on the effort to trace the cultural biography of sacred,
singularized or non-commodifiable things.
• Relativism
The final two concepts for consideration — relativism and comparison — are often taken as
being diametrical opposites. Relativism has the ideological thesis that "each culture is an unique
configuration with its own special flavor, its own style and genius" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:5). Quite
frequently this uniqueness is taken by anthropologists to be an article of faith and it is not closely
explained. Moreover, that uniqueness is only by degree, for if an object or a society was totally unique,
others (and researchers!) would not be able to comprehend it. As Kaplan and Manners reveal, the
extreme relativist begins with the assumption that no two cultures are alike [and] that pattern, order and
meaning are violated if elements are abstracted for purposes of comparison.
• Comparativism
Comparativists are also inclined to believe that societies and cultures are not alike and that the
functional integration of societies differs. But comparativists also believe that all of humanity is functionally
integrated, and that there is as much sense in demonstrating the ways in which societies are similar /
integrated as in the ways in which they are unique. Comparativists therefore tend to view the craft of
comparison as methodologically legitimate and scientifically productive (6). The inescable problem that
comparativists face, however, is knowing whether the social or cultural phenomena being compared are
sufficiently similar in style, shape or structure to justify the comparative effort. That is always both a
theoretically and an empirical judgement.
Goldschmidt (1966) attempted to solve this dilemma by drawing up the framework of comparative
functionalism. He put forward the view that cultural events and items can be compared (even when
explained only in their own / emic terms) if they are presented as social or cultural responses to ongoing
questions of survival / existence by the societies being compared. In this way, the comparativist is able
to justify how he or she can conceivable overcome Malinowski’s (1961 [1922]} criticism that the
comparison of behaviors drawn from different behavior sets is fundamentally an exercise in delusion: one
cannot compare what (otherwise, in their own right) are incomparables. Thus Goldschmidt’s measure of
functional comparison is really a measure of equivalence, not of comparison.
2.3.8 Related Data Analysis
From the immediately preceding subsections (predominantly 2.3.4. to 2.3.7 inclusive), a number
of tendencies are in evidence with regard to what the literature on anthropology reveals about
conventional / developing practice in terms of data gathering — that is, data gathering for the kind of
dominance / subjugation issues being covered in the research agenda being developed. The pertinent
tendencies are now given in Table 2.3.8./1.
TABLE2.3.8./1
STATE-OF-THE-ARTPRAC ICEININTERPR TIVENTHROPOLOGY: DATAGATHERINGPROBL MATICS TENDENCY
ONGOINGUNCERTAINTIES
•EXPRESSEDDATA
Interpretiveanth opologistsndv ideusof experimentaltechn quesofdatagath ring,ndref r question-and-answerme sofdatgathering(which appeartodependconside ablyf rh isucc ssu on theanthropologistsca acitydev lopappr pr ate interpersonalconditionsf rv rb lexpre sion)(1>1).
Manyoftheseeminglyimporta tingswithculture,ch
as'success’,‘so l’(or‘cult re’its lf)h venopalpablef rm. Theyardifficulttoest”,ip ofact .
•CONTEXTUALDAT
Interpretiveanth opologistsndp f rw rki 'naturallaboratories’wherecriticalparamet rsrnot manipulate(2>1).
Inteeabs nceofmethodologicalanipulation,interpr tive anthropologistsredrawntowardteec ityfine-c mb studyornat alituationsi rdertc eateteit c l elementsofthcont xt’.Suchanalysesntexth vt contendwithfifficultma tersfcircumstantiality(2>2).
•NON-LOGICALDAT
Interpretiveanthropologistsndsu portvi wha peoplewhoactingivensocietiesdalway accordancewithexplicitrC rtes anmodelsf ratiocination;theresearcherh sdet rminifnd whenformall gicpro sshavebeeut liz dinthat society’sdeterminationfth tbe avi ra di individual’sconsciouawarene sfth tformal (ratiodnative)reasoning3>1).
Peopleingivens ci tydothaprop sitionsthe read! Doesthresearcher’sformalpropositionsc rre p dwi ht informalandfor lules,ideasbelief .F al propositionscannevermpletelytallywi h’n tur ’.
.THICKDATA
Interpretiveanthropologists(ofthG e tz anm uld)nd tofavorf bricatedandhicklydescribfict nsd r toputacrossnholisticndinteg atedc untfh 'removed' r‘other1societiesyinv stigate(4>1).
Thickdescriptionsareoubleconstructions:t y ethnographer’sco st uctionftherpeo l ’sconstructions whattheyandeircompatriotsreup(4>2).
•DISCURSIVEATA
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In summarizing ten inclinations of interpretvist anthropology, Table 2.3.8./1 reveals an equivalent
number of uncertainties which hermeneutic scientists / ethnographers ought address before, during and
after the conduct of their research. Taken together, these ten problematics suggest that "the problem of
[faithfully studying] other cultures is conceptual rather than empirical" (Hanson and Martin 1973:206-7).
Two principal conceptual dangers exist. The first is that ethnographers are inclined to view new / other
/ fresh societies in the ways that they have already been prone to studying earlier / previous societies.
The second is that Cartesian imperatives for neatness, order and predictability are inclined to characterize
all science — even interpretivist modes. Hence, it is hard for ethnographers not to be drawn towards a
priori conceptualizations as to how a new society will function in order to match how known societies are
thought to function by the established communities of scientists.
The ten problematics of Table 2.3.8./1 do, however, suggest that interpretivist anthropologists
are indeed losing 'their innocent eye’, and are coming to terms with the myriad of ways in which their own
seemingly innocent presence, innocent questioning and innocent expectations are in fact heavily loaded,
heavily weighted and heavily biased. Consonantly, when Spiro (1984:343) (and also originally, Shweder)
suggests that in the conduct of ethnography, there is more to thinking than reason and evidence, it is clear
that the nonrationalities that are being newly observed belong to the thought and actions of researchers
as much as to the thought and actions of the researched. Table 2.3.8./1 implies that data gathering in
ethnography is no longer just being recognized as a matter of the careful observation and systematic
documentation of what people say and do — nor is it "just a matter of the mechanics of recording speech
and activity" (Gubrium 1988:74).
Instead, interpretivist anthropologists are acknowledging that though ethnographic fieldwork
involves the analytical participation of the researcher in and amongst the dynamism of the host
population’s everyday activities, and in the dynamism of the researcher’s own productive role in the
manufacture of scientific data. Hence, social science is now known to be not only grossly fabricated, but
grossly pre-fabricative, too.
2.3.9 Cross-Evaluation with Postmodernity
Since anthropology is an exceedingly wide-ranging discipline it will not be possible in the space
available within this subsection (2.3.9) to offer anything approaching a comprehensive review of the ways
that theory in anthropology can or does have interface with ideas on postmodernity. Accordingly, a
representative review will be given of the way in which approaches to applied anthropology have or can
cross-fertilize with postmodernity.
And these loosely representative comments will largely follow the observations of Johannsen
(1992) who explored the relationship between applied anthropology and interpretive ethnography, and who
saw interpretive ethnography as equivalent to postmodernist ethnography. That assumption of
equivalence is undoubtedly a matter of some argument in its own right, yet it is in fact taken as an article
of faith by Johannsen without being accounted for in the 1992 paper: her keywords merely and blandly
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list "interpretive or post-modernist (sic!) ethnography" together. There is no overt explication of their fit
in her text, nor is their reference to other literature where this symmetry is accounted for.
Where Johannsen is not explicit on the matching profile of ‘interpretive’ and ‘postmodern’
ethnography, she is perspicuous on the mutualities between applied anthropology and interpretive (or
postmodern) ethnography. She finds the view that seeming incompatibilities exist between praxis
oriented, theoreticaiiy unsophisticated and ethnically problematic work of applied anthropology and the
theoretically rich, contemplative work of interpretive / postmodern ethnography to be a gross exaggeration
of circumstance. To her, the practical inclinations of applied anthropology can be improved considerably
and reciprocally through cross-tilling with the lucubration of what she styles as interpretive / postmodern
study.
Principally, Johannsen finds that applied anthropologists have common ground with interpretive
/ postmodern ethnographers in the interventionist nature of their work. Where applied anthropologists
seek the closest of involvement in order to affect change, interpretive / postmodern ethnographers seek
the fullest of contact in order to locate the richest of insights into value and meaning. Both applied
anthropologists and interpretive ethnographers therefore have to face substantial ethnical matters. While
outside observers may question the propriety of the commitment of applied anthropologists to planned,
intended intervention (73), other external judges may question the degree to which interpretive /
postmodern ethnographers can ever ‘disappear from the texts’ they construct about a host population (76).
Assuming those ethical dilemmas can be overcome, Johannsen believes that applied
anthropologists have a good deal to teach or remind interpretive / postmodern ethnographers. Such
‘instruction’ predominantly surrounds the need for anthropological / ethnographic intervention to be holist.
Consequently it is generally unwise for change / advocacy / developmental intervention to be conducted
by the applied anthropologist / postmodern ethnographer alone: many critical roles in strategic intervention
are better dealt with by other experts, other professions, and / or those from other disciplines working in
concert with the anthropologist / ethnographer (Peterson 1974:315).
Overall, however, Johannsen appears to consider that interpretive/postmodern ethnography has
more to offer in terms of seeding or instructional value than vice versa. She finds interpretive-postmodern
ethnography to be much more than "the vapid form of literary criticism" that certain ‘nonzealots’ deem it
to be (Johannsen 1992:71). To her, the extremely self-critical orientation of interpretive / postmodern
insight can draw theoretical ethnographers and pragmatic anthropologist alike into the identification of, and
the sustained dialogue with, many different groups within the society under analysis. She appears to
proffer that interpretive-postmodem approaches enlarge the possibilities of investigation into heterogenous
society. In this respect, Johannsen echoes Rickman (1979:58-73): since interpretvist / postmodern
inquiry in ethnography is distinctly and powerfully concerned with the implicit meanings that events and
behaviors have for the actors themselves, it promotes a manifestly human study of society. The unities
that ethnographers and anthropologists are drawn towards finding within the societies they investigate are
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no longer so predominantly driven by ‘politics’ and / or by ‘economics’ — the uncovered unities are
increasingly found to be ‘human’ or ‘symbolic’ in their characteristics.
Johannsen considers that the fastidious, self-critical recording methods of interpretive /
postmodern methods of symbolic and societal representation can offer considerable insight for applied
anthropologists. Their focus on the problematics of cultural delineation has in her view, lead interpretive
/ postmodern ethnographers to refreshing ways in which the authority of texts has been negotiated
between researchers and their hosts: that liberalization of authority has not only encouraged the
identification of a wider range of "voices" within the society — but has yielded the production of more
concrete representative texts (74). That critical self-reflection has also helped develop the need for
effective communication between ethnographers and their readerships (Marcus and Cushman 1982:52)
— and ultimately to the more commonplace development of different rhetorical styles for different clients
and audiences. Thus, at each end of the ethnographic process there has been some degree of
oxygenation: a wider range of local voices and storylines to listen to AND a wider repertoire of
broadcasting styles to re-narrate those storylines by.
Johannsen (1992:77) considers that Interpretive / postmodern ethnography can and has been
a tonic for applied anthropology in other ways. Its destablization of orthodox standards of science has
encouraged the acceptance of new basic values and truths. Its intensive use of iterative and reflexive
research styles has shown how members of host populations can learn about themselves through the
careful ‘enactment’ of social science and the deliberate ‘re-enactment’ of social science (78). In these
fashions, interpretive / postmodern ethnography has helped derive sorts of anthropology which are
conceivably more complete, (i.e., more exhaustive) more enlightened and more accessible (79).
Yet, it has to be acknowledged that the value of interpretive / postmodern approaches for applied
anthropology (and for other areas of social science) is not entirely and obviously positive. Rabinow
(1985:7) considers that the postmodern ethnography is as yet an unclear and an emergent genre. Dwyer
(1977) advises that as yet the relationships developed between ethnographers and even their principal
informants are rarely anything other than thin and unreciprocal. Johannsen (1992:78) recognizes that
even interpretive / postmodern ethnography has achieved only small success in the manner in which it
has given host populations reasonable levels of control over the devised and reconstituted representations
made of them. More high-priority collaborative work is required to permit ‘locals’ to speak for themselves
(78;79).
The anthropology literature is nowadays beginning to suggest that applied anthropology does,
in fact, share points of significant convergence with ‘postmodern’ anthropology. The ethnographic
encounter is being increasingly found to be an open-ended, constantly changing experience (Marcus and
Cushman 1982:45), and reflexive, discursive interpretive styles are proving to be of relevance in wider
panorama of applied situations, such as in nations / states / regions which have syncretic (i.e., multi¬
tradition) populations (Turner 1982:313-4), in contemporaryWestern / North American societywhere mass
participatory cultural forms exist (298), and where new significant events or meaningful moments are
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identified in the lifespace of a society (as perhaps is represented by the tour / the vacation / the holiday
itself (174-5)).
As yet, however, the interpretive styles of postmodern ethnography (that applied anthropologists
can borrow from) are still adolescent. While Geertz (1972) acknowledges that the rituals and symbols
people offer of and about themselves belong more in the realm of art than of objective reality, he also
acknowledges that the reproductive work of interpreting ethnographers also ought more definitively be
described as ‘art’ rather than ‘reality’. To some observers, postmodern forms of interpretation have
prospered in ethnography because anthropology was and is not decently meeting its aims of cultural
representation (Marcus and Fischer 1986:33). Postmodern ethnography must continue to improve its
capacity to depict lifeworlds faithfully. And to that end, it must continue to divest authority: if postmodern
/ interpretive approaches are to influence anthropology on a wide front, its ethnographers must continue
to find appropriate methods to give up textual dominance in their writing — however impossible that
currently appears to be (Watson 1989).
As yet, what Johannsen deems to be postmodern ethnography "has focussed too egocentrically
on the native’s dialogue with [ethnographers] and too little on their dialogue with one another" (Barth
1989:134). Let the postmodern laboratory be enlarged still wider, for further advances in an extensive
mix of interpretive-theoretical modes and in practical-collaborative approaches. Postmodernity is yet raw
in its ethnography.
2.3.10 Summary
Subsection 2.3 has covered some of the leading imperatives that drive contemporary
ethnographic insight into power and truth. The anthropology literature has been reviewed to reveal the
rise of romanticist, arbitrary, symbolic and expressive accounts of culture vis-a-vis traditionally
established enlightenment and rational accounts of lifeworlds. To that end, the steady but uncertain
spread of insider / subjective / emic storylines to rank alongside and ahead of outsider / objective / etic
accounts of populations has also been acknowledged. And the critical endeavor of anthropology has been
found to be that of uncovering human beliefs: who shares which public meanings with whom, when and
where. Culture has thereby no longer been seen to be a thing (or set-of-things) acting in its own right —
but to be those more fluid and evanescent thoughts that people participate in contextually and inter-
subjectively. The anthropological literature therefore indicates that culture now equates to ‘the constructed
thought’ of associating populations in various fixities and unfixities of time and space.
In uncovering the way in which anthropologists increasingly acknowledge the contextual nature
of culture, the subsection has explicated a number of Shweder’s (1984:51-56) inverted findings about
culture. In the present context they may be re-caste as follows:
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(i) from self-constructed knowledge to other-dependent learning. truths have been found to be
largely social and contestable, existing ‘communally’ within certain people’s heads rather than
out-there, in reality;
(ii) from rational to nonrational man: power is not only utilized by people and institutions decidedly,
but also unintentionally;
(iii) from progressive development to frame-switching. truths cannot be ranked in terms of quality or
adequacy;
(iv) from personal constraint to interpersonal constraint consistent worldviews perhaps more
commonly belong to groups and societies than to individuals; and,
(v) from personal invention to collective representations: so many of a group’s or society’s truths are
inherited from other and transmitted to them rather than being freshly imagined or cognitively
reasoned within the given population.
Taken together the five above inversions suggest that there is no unitary reality in which all
groups and societies do or should participate. Romanticist anthropologists seek to find reality
manufactured in each of its interpersonal locales. Increasingly in plural society, ethnographers are finding
it important to map the obscure, but deeply emotional, ties people have variously within the society
towards ethnic identifications and inherited truths. When anthropologists search for individual
consciousness they accentuate such embedded forms of group consciousness. And that consciousness
increasingly emerges within — or is recognized within — macro-level institutional and group practices, as
much as it does in micro-level individual behaviors. Hence group / societal / statist solidarities are now
seen to not only exploit the collective identities of individuals, but also to re-create and re-generate them.
Under the rise of romanticist viewpoints, then, ethnographers have come to support the
comprehension that culture ought not to be weighed up as a natural entity in its own proactive or reified
right, but as an expressive yet changeable set of forces which vanish and reform the moment they are
‘found’. Hence anthropologists are tending to find the problem of culture’ not so much to be empirical
as conceptual. They do not so much nowadays seek to cultivate a method that can locate and isolate
culture-as-entity, as they seek to cultivate a set of imaginative and symbolic codes which can trace
culture-as-ephemeral-influence. Since culture is thereby increasingly seen to be dynamic and dissolving,
ethnographers are tending to prefer to investigate statements about it, rather than to search for the thing
itself — that which melts. Consonantly, ‘culture’ becomes operationalized as accepted common
knowledge — or for some, ‘discourse’, for short.
In this sense, anthropologists like Lindstrom lie neatly within the Foucauldian mold. They see
the ascendancy, in research, of discourse over culture, and find the discursive order to be a valid
substitute for the various levels of group / society / state. To Lindstrom, that inevitably lies within
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discourse, and in the institutional practices of each discursive order. It is discourse that carries power:
it is discourse which dominates and violates.
2.4 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE: THE DISCOURSE ON POWER AND TRUTH
2.4.1 A General Introduction to the Discipline’s Contemporary Outlooks
This review of the political science literature starts from the premise that political scientists are
very much concerned with what Freud (1955) called the tragic paradox of the human story. Freud’s
tragic paradox constitutes the view that in order to be ’integrated’ and 'successful', each complex or
civilized / civilizing society necessitates the suppression of instinctual life: "Civilized man [sic!] has
exchanged some part of his chances for happiness for a measure of security" (92). Civilized / civilizing
societies repress individuals instinct to be free: that is the tragic cost of civilization. And political scientists
study how various groups and interests in society compete and contest to take control of those inevitable
repressive forces. They investigate how groups and interests seek to restructure society in line with their
own preferences, materialities and internal logics as they deny the instincts and preferences of others that
are not compatible with their own lived world.
In working inherently in, on and about Freud’s tragic paradox, political scientists seek to uncover
the uniformities of collective actions, that is the consistencies by which groups and interests endeavor to
stamp their preferences on the broader society of which they are part. In order to trace these uniformities,
political scientists attempt to trace the intentions of the various groups and interests — they attempt to
trace intentionality. Thus, political scientists seek to reveal the policies of those parties and
communalities of perspective, where the term policy is an expansive one "embracing both what is
intended and what occurs as a result of the intention" (Heclo 1972:84-85). And those policies include
decisions not to intervene or not to take action, just as do for conscious decisions to intervene on any
issue (Freeman 1974:4). In its fullest sense, then, the intentionalities and nonintentionalities (that political
scientists investigate) are highly dynamic: they are the identified behavioral consistencies and repetitivities
(Eulau and Prewitt 1973:464-88).
In exploring policy, intentionality and the play of the tragic paradox political scientists can work
from a considerable range of approaches to knowledge within the discipline. The same societal
phenomena can be serviced in terms of numerous competing explanations. It is most rare for questions
in political science to form around a single agreed-upon judgement on primary intentionality. In political
science, there therefore tends to be a pandamenia of different perspectives, under normal circumstances.
There are, as for other human and cultural sciences, no all-purpose empirical tests in political science by
which each account of policy warfare and every version of the facts about a political encounter can be
examined. And, moreover, political science is a discipline which heavily borrows concepts, theories and
methods from other social sciences, as will now be revealed.
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In order to introduce the commonplace perspectives that are utilized in political science, this
section will adopt the judgement of Zuckerman (1991) who classifies five principal research schools within
political science: viz.,
• Rational choice theory,
• Psycho-political perspectives [known as Political Attitudes and Behavior (in original)];
• Anthro-political perspectives [known as Approaches from Anthropology (in original)];
• Critical / conflict theory [listed as Marx’s theory (in original)]; and,
• Weberian socio-political perspectives [known as Weber’s social science (in original)].
Table 2.4.1./1 now provides an elementary introduction to the premises and methods upon which these
five perspectives are based.
Zuckerman (80-81) draws a number of substantial conclusions about the characteristics of the
five political science approaches. They are reduced here:
(a) Level of analysis
Some perspectives emphasize analysis at the level of the individual (e.g., rational action theory
and psycho-political perspectives), others place the individual in an enveloping social structure
(e.g., critical / conflict theory and anthro-political perspectives), while Weberian views stress the
interdependence of each level of analysis.
(b) Rationalities
Rational choice theorists consider each individual to be a rational maximizer of their subjective
utilities, anthro-political scientists search for motives, and Weberian investigators hunt for styles
of orientation to action.
(c) Structural forms
Conflict theorists tend to recognize the mode of production as the principal component of the
social structure, anthro-political scientists seek to explore the interactions between the key
identified components of the given society, while Weber presents a typology of idealized
structures.
(d) Evidence
Many conflict theorists (particularly Marxists) and rational action theorists deduce their theories
from axioms; anthro-political scientists are drawn towards thickly described explanations, while
conflict theorists, Weberians and rational choice theorists, but particularly psycho-political
scientists, depend heavily on sample surveys of populations.
Clearly, none of the five (or any other political science approach) is able to territorialize the
discipline: each of the avenues to knowledge of policy and intentionality are attempts to privilege a certain
observation of the world. And as Zuckerman (81) concludes, the models invariably talk past each other
in a number of instances.
TABLE2.4.1,/1
PRINCIPALRESEARCHSCHOOLSIOLITICI N E: FIVECONTRASTINGAPPROACHESTKNOWLEDGE
RationalChoice Theory
Psycho-Political Perspectives
Anthro-Politlcal Perspectives
Crttlcal/Confllct Theory
WeberianSocio- Politicalerspectives
Fundamentals
ofthe Approach
Theradical, simplificatoryapproach whichusesformal mathematicalodelst explainpoliticalact ons. Thepoliticalworldis seentobcomposed principallyofinf med andcalculating individualswhooish toimproveheir economicwell-being.
Theviewthat politicalbehavior stemsfro variationsin attitudes,mo ives andother psychological characteristics.
Theapproach organizesresearchat thegroupor structurallevel, utilizingdefined settingslikevillages, legislatives,po itical parties.Istudith waysth tose 'members’ofthesaid communityperceive andinteract.
Criticaltheories(lik anthro-political theories)concentrate uponthestructural level,emphasizingth wayparticular componentsfa societyinter-relat . Considerableatt ntion isgiventohwayn whichtheeconomic orderinfluenc sth structures.
Theviewt atins ghtto politicsc meinsh ftsf light(i.e.,criticisms, political-philosophy, scientificmethodologies) ratherthanfromsingula andcomplextheoriesn politics.Eacheffortt viewthpoliticalworldis necessarilyspe ialized andthereby limited/partial.
Preferred Levelof Focus
Focusesnth individual;assumesll peoplearerati nal maximizersofself- interest,andssumes allpeoplecalcu atthe valueofalternative goals.
Focusesonth purposefulactionof individuals—as predominantlydraw fromthe measurementof attitudesbasedon directpersonal experience.
Focusesnthways
inwhichindividualsact collectively,ultura ly processinginformation andction.Theimis todrawlarge conclusionsf r denselytexturedfact .
Focusesupon collectiveproblems, andco tendsthr ugh contentiona d disputationtoforce awarenessofthes class/ommural societalillsth attentionofthosefelt
tobeinap sition solvethem.
Focusesonth judgementthatpoliticsis aninfi itemultiplicityof successivelyand coexistinglyemerging anddis ppearingevents bothwithinandutsi e ofindividuals.Weberi n analysisrel tesindividual levelsofanalysist grouplevelsofanalysis viatypologiesfs c al actionndofpoli cal structures( eebelow).
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TABLE2.4.1./1(Continued)
RationalChoice Theory
Psycho-Political Perspectives
Anthro-Political Perspectives
Critical/Conflict Theory
WeberianSocio- Politicalerspectives
Preferred Modef Evidence
Seeksinsighttothe assumedmotivationsf individuals;doesnot necessarilye d evidenceothpolitical cultureonpo itical events.
Reliesh avilyon sampleurveysof populationsand publicopinionolls. Heavyuseof multipleregression andsophisticated statistics.
Assumescommunitie existasetofocial relationships;seeks evidenceoth existenceofsy ms ofsocialrelations. Seeks'plausible readings' ot explanation.
Seeksinsightto politicalands ci problemsANDseeks actionswhichcahelp resolveth m. Assumesthat causesofthe problemsliewithin socialandp lit cal institutions.
Recognizesthat descriptionand explanationwillalways beincomplete,withf r instanceMarxist"class" beingnomoretha‘a idealtype’.Weber considereditrit calt examinetheme nings thatsurroundhumand socialaction,viz.,the subjective understandingswhich applyndthewebs-of- significancepeoplepi aroundthemselves. Evidenceorjudgement mustbeobtainedatth individualandstruct r l levelsofanalysis.
Preference Regarding Comparative Analysis
Assumesallpeoplect rationallytomaximize theirself-interest.
Attitudesar arrangedinto clustersofbe iefsin ordertuncover (comparatively) underlyingprinciples andpreferences.
Seekstounderstand themeaningofactio s withincommunities normallyonain- depth/particular (Geertzian)basis; manyresearchers denytheabilityo generalize:ach communityisheldt beunique.
Attemptsogather informationcritically upontheacti sof everydayinstitutions withinagivesocial order/state/nation.Bu assumestherr universalprinciplesof social,ec nomica d politicallife.
Weberiananalysis emphasizesverstehen understanding—i.e., empathetic understandingof individualsthecontext oftheirwnsociety insteadofbeing comparedtindividuals elsewhere.
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TABLE2.4.1./1(Continued)
RationalChoice Theory
Psycho-Political Perspectives
Anthro-Political Perspectives
Critical/Conffict Theory
WeberianSocio- Politicalerspectives
Preference Regarding Theoretical Integration
Rationalthe ries modelsfhowpolitic wouldbeifthem d ’s assumptionsweretrue.
Psytho-political approachese modelswhichse k
tolinkattitudes behaviors.
Anthro-political perspectivesconsti ute distinctive methodologiesrather thanintegrated theories;eyhavfew generalconc pts hypotheses.
Critical/conflictthe ry meltsthdistinction (deliberately)betw en descriptiveand normativetheory.It integratessaction (ratherthanitseory) aroundchangend disequilibrium.
Weberianexplanations dependotheattribution ofadequate/appropriate motives.Thesetiv s areplac dwithinfour¬ celltypologyof traditional,emotion l absolutevaluerattonal, andinstrumentalvalue rationalacti ns.For instancec pitalist democratics cietyi characterizedbyt spreadofinstrum ntal rationalorientationst actionndrationallegal authoritystructures.
TABLE2.4.1./1(Continued)
RationalChoice Theory
Psycho-Political Perspectives
Anthro-Political Perspectives
Critical/Conflict Theory
WeberianSocio- Politicalerspectives
Preference Regarding Empirical Knowledge
Theempiricalaccur cy
ofassumptionsinot particularlyim ortant; deductivelogicis emphasizedinste d.
Thesestudi sof motivesand dispositionstend beheavily quantitative; evidencereplaces deductivelogic.
Reliesonth interpretationof observedbehaviorsas gathered ethnographically— predominantlybythe gatheringof multiplicityoffac st permitthink description.’S me anthro-political scientistsbeli vethait
isproperand reasonablet generalizefrom ethnographicdat— byusingthe techniquesof multivariateanalysis uponmeasuresof abstractvariables.
Seeksinsightonthe patternsofinteracting structures(e.g.,as seenthroughclass)in ordertexplain, predict,anth n establishthe necessaryconditions
totransfersoci tyi better(?)/morejust(?) /equalworld(?)Each critical/onflicttheory model(e.g.,Marxism) tendsohaveitsown distinctconcepts, variables,hypotheses.
Weberiananalysisc n
beconductedvia psychologicaltestsbuti morecommonlyobtained viathecompar tivestudy oflargenumb rs cases.
SOURCE:PredominantlyZuckerman(1991)andH reo984).
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In analyzing the intentionality of political actors, contemporary political scientists are prone, like
Foucault, to finding evidence of its play and engagement in all corners of society (Harland 1987:161):
Politics is no longer regarded, if it ever properly was, as that which ‘politicians’ or ‘political parties’ engage
in. "Politics is no longer restricted to the level of general class relations, but percolates down into
domestic relations, schooling relations, parent-child relations, and of course sexual relations" (161).
Political scientists unearth mechanisms of ‘power’, and incident of ‘policy’ formation ubiquitously — as did
Foucault: ‘politics is over and above the individual" (162) even for those approaches which assume
political events to be inspired by individual actions / initiatives.
For the current development of the research agenda into truthmaking, however, emphasis will
be given to the literature that attempts to account for those competitive struggles whereby groups struggle
for power and authority. It will tend to pivot upon those interest-group theories and those investigations
of interest-group claims and challenges upon legitimacy. But that does not mean that the political
science surveyed will be candid and prosaic. Political scientists do not have the plain and simple task
of analyzing the essentially political role of politicians vis-a-vis, for example, fundamentally technical role
of civil servants: "the definition of what is political and what is technical... is anything but straight-forward
(Baumgartner 1989:5). Undoubtedly, a number of trite and stereotypical assessments of political action
and of policy science still abound. The turn-of-the-century words of Arthur Bentley (1908) are still
appropriate today: time is ripe for the outlawing from political analysis of those sorts of ‘metaphysical
ghosts’ that portray politico-legislative action as fundamentally the work of legislators striving earnestly
for the public welfare. Intentionality in legislation and, intentionality in politics is routinely much more
clever circuitous, and cloaked than that.
2.4.2 A Specific Introduction to the Discipline’s Contemporary Outlook on Power and Historical
Truth
Few, if any, political scientists — whether they would be Weberian commentators, political
behaviorists or even rational choice theorists — would subscribe to the view that there is a single, simple
truth ‘out there’ calling attention to itself (Zuckerman 1991:163). Both players and actors in politics, and
political scientists tend to recognize that truths’ in politics are highly dynamic. The truths that are current
on any issue, in any arena, or within any institution in politics are prone to changing, to evolving, and to
being the subject of new / vogue / recast interpretations: "The content of [an issue / a conflict encounter
/ a policy] has only a minor impact on how many different actors actually [view / relate / decide] it"
(Baumgartner 1989:213).
In order to explain the way this dynamism is mapped and modelled in the contemporary political
science literature, this subsection will consider the way truth and power are seen to work in and through
government. The subsection will pivot on C.O. Jone’s (1977) analysis of political action from a policy
process front. Historical truths will be deemed to be no different than any other truths in politics — i.e.,
malleable products which are accepted, re-shaped or denied, depending upon the broader preferences
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and missions of each set of interests involved. And power will be viewed as that sum of forces /
influences / authorities any of those interests can bring to bear upon ‘truth’ (i.e., each or any of those
historical truths) during the policy process.
During the analysis, the following critical considerations will apply:
• policy conflicts are deemed by political scientists to be clashes of different values (i.e.,
confrontations of perspectives on ‘truth’) and policy decisions are those settlements which are
drawn up by those parties in disagreement (Eyestone 1972:80);
• the problems and the environments which policies and intentionalities address are extremely
difficult to hold constant (Jones 1977:212);
• different players in the game rarely accept the same given problem (Wildavsky 1979:404-5);
• the policies that individuals / interests / institutions form are highly dependent upon the
knowledge that they hold and receive (Jones 1977:218);
• the policies that individuals / interests / institutions derive are produced "in a big pot in which
many stir" (Meltsner 1975:116-117); and,
• all of the players in the political process or in the business of policy formation have imperfect
knowledge: none knows ‘the whole truth’ (Schattschneider 1969:53).
The six above considerations are some of the major premises upon which the Jones policy
process approach is based. In his view, policies that are current in any political situation are almost
always based upon ambiguous and contestable data. And they themselves are ambiguous, having to
be ‘inferred’ rather than clearly and overtly read. Accordingly, Jones (1977:8) codifies his framework of
the analysis of the dynamics of policy development around nineteen orienting propositions. They are now
listed in Table 2.4.2./1.
In devising his set of nineteen propositions, Jones (1977:15) attempts to show how from a
political science perspective "one person’s problem may be another person’s profit". He suggests that
where problems between players can be sorted out without producing demands upon others who are not
directly involved, the problem remains private in nature. But when the problem escalates it can become
public: "when the consequences are perceived by others and considered to be significant enough to be
controlled, a public is born (16; bold emphasis added). Jones quotes Dewey (1927:15-16) in this regard:
"the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an
extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for”. Hence, by
implication, Jones writes in and around the tragic paradox. The nineteen orientating propositions of
Table 2.4.2./1 revolve around the ways in which private groups seek the platform ofgovernment in order
to control the behaviors of other private groups. The Jones characterizations of public policy draw
attention to the way private interests of all sorts can incrementally dress their programs, projects and
TABLE2.4.2./1
JONES’SGE RALFRAMEWORKOP LICYANA Y I :
NINETEENORI NTINGPROPOSIT ONSLICYDEVE OPM TA DIMPL MEN ATIO
THENINETE NPROPOSITIONS
HISTORICALTRUTHSCENARIO
1.Eventsinsocietyareinterpret ddiff ntwaybi e peopleatdiff renttimes. 2.Manyproblemsmaresultfromthsa eeve 3.Peoplehavvaryingdegreesfaccesthp licyr ce ingovernment. 4.Notallpublicproblemsract doningovernment. 5.Manyprivateroblemsarct doingove nment 6.Manyprivateroblemsarct doingove nmentsth ugh theywerepublicrobl ms.
e.g.,Pr sidentK nn dydiedi1963yetvi wsofh sstr ngthsaqualitiv nfall variouslyinthereedec dessincn; e.g.,CivilWarruptsinYugoslavia:neighboringnati n /states/ethnicgro sac owid expanseofEasternndW sturoperealigvariou ly;mldhisto caltruthsr ki dled
in countriesdistantfr mYug slavia; e.g.,Somepopulations/ethnicgroups/subculturesmaybabltexertfo cWashingto , CanberraoMadridbecauseth yrgeographicallysituatecl si ,ndblnc it dly lobbynbehalfftheircultu e,past,id ntiwi hrel tives ; e.g.,Somepopulations/ethnicgr ups/subculturesdnunderstandtheivfederal/state/local systemofgovernance;thnecessityexperi ncei plainingth irc smworid i w/their inheritances/theirtraditionsvia‘spec alized’;‘p ofessio alrfulltime’oliti i sybt them; e.g.,Economicliteswhoh ldparticularistoric ltru smaybablylob yingpresence ortinfluencepoliti aldecis onswellb yo dthn mberfpe plehoh dh strut s— orwellbeyondthinher ntvirtueft sruths( resuchahing!); e.g.,Ownersofhistoricousei istatt ricr insucc s fullyc nvinceinfluence governmentintotakingo erfinancial/maintenanc /administrativerespo ibilitythsi— theyareblopersuadegovernmentdecisi n-mak rsthathouses/estates/ruin decentlyorf llyrepres ntativefthsta e;
TABLE2.4.2./1(Continued)
THENINETE NPROPOSITIONS
HISTORICALTRUTHSCENARIO
7.Mostpr blemsaren’solv dbygovernmentth ughma y actedonther . 8.Policymakersarnotfacedwithgiv nprob em. 9.Mostdecisionmakingibasedonlittlinform ti nndp or communication. 10.Programsftenrefl ctanttainableconse sur therth substantiveconviction. 11.Problemsanddemanreco stantlybei gfi e redefinedinthpolicyrocess. 12.Policymakerss metimedefinprob ef reoplwho havenotdefinedprobl msforthemse v s.
e.g.,C rtainmarginalg oupsclaimtheovernmentst t‘official’ r‘c mmon’hist ri sfth statBunder-representmarginalgroups;ove nmentactpothprobl m,bcan ots lvi Whenencouragementisgivtre-writingofhi toryaccomm dattti smargin lgr ps, othernewmarginalgroupsemergetstath rc s—andnew ysfb ingu der¬ representedbecomid ntifi dforththlds fma ginalpopulations,antn wt claimants; e.g.,Someclaim‘thgivenproblem’inrtaist ttbha sencfhist ricalr cord;s e claimittobe‘theabsencefonafidhist ric lrecorcf,s meclaIhinad quacyf thein erpretationofhistoricalecord’,s meclaimb'anabs cfp re iationtod y ofthemoresparticularast;andother...etcetera e.g.,Thestate-in-questionunder repr sentstindig ousoe h ichi t ryandc l uwi hini territorybecauseithnour aucratswhoa etr inedanth op logically,ohum nistic lly, understandtheculturallogicofhosegr ups—ihistoric lcomm ttedavfu lyq alifi d historiansbutdnotavepr fessio alnth opologists; e.g.,Thegiv nstatBhasofficialsand/orf i erwhg nuinelyanttdevel pmor equitable/representatives athi tory,bmuchofthwouldinv vrec gni ionlandrights toindigenous/marginalizedpopulations;hestateleade shipcannotrth sa dr htfo r offfendingthmineralindustrywhoarkeeretaincc sth selandduri gp iod sustainedrecession.Thesultirhetoricalappea eme tfolandrigb tco tinuedecon mic empowermentfothmin allobby; e.g.,Historyandherita efortheg v nst teubtr sponsibilitfDep r m nt Environmenta dL ndsbef ritwaremodell dtechDep rtm ntofH ri ag Lands,beforehistorical/heritagematterwe eshif dthDepartm ntfAr s,Cultu Humanities,whichitselfsremode ledbecomhDepartm ntofTourism,Arand Culture...II e.g.,Themarginalizedpopul tionwith ntlarn ioc nsistsfeoploint al rationalitiesrecommunal—th yhavfewindividualswhok erblrt c tr woridview(s)radvanctheirhist y( s)vit ongincfi i ualizedork-stylesflegislat r inthemainstreamsoci ty.Consequentlyainstreamgov rnmentp w rrel s‘trusted* academicor‘handy’secondarycou tsfthp pulation’willratherfr mr g adie ofdirectandimmediatevi ws;
TABLE2.4.2./1(Continued)
THENINETE NPROPOSITIONS
HISTORICALTRUTHSCENARIO
13.Manyprogramsmodevel pedandimplementwithoutth problemsev rha ingb ecl a lydefined. 14.Mostpeopledn tmaintainintereotherp opl 's problems 15.Mostpeopledn tpr ferlargchange 16.Mostpeoplecannoide tifyublicpolicy. 17.Allpolicysystemshavebias 18.Noidealpolicysystemexistsapartfromthepref rencesf thearchitectoft atsystem.
e.g.,Severalstatesg ttogeth roc l brateth200 hannive saryftlandingof/birt of/nominationfXYZ.Bubys eacc unts,shinessbright/pr udli tovertregi , whereasbyotherXYZissurroundednotori tyaninf m .Bureaucratsw rkingfothst assumetheonlynecessaryrimportanthistortrose teon .Nsu tain drese rchi mountedohist ricalrpoliti lrepresentativiti s—thB gRo eate/W nd fulEvifun d andmountedaxi matically; e.g.,Theaggre atehistoryofthsta 'spoliticallylect dBoard- f-He i a ebec m sthoffic l historyfortheW oleSta .ThosBo rdmemb rsarultra-knowledg ablb utt iown antecedentsnultra-keboutth irowninherit nc—b tt yr mad falter tiv historiesfthatregionparallel dthosofrfbreparent ; e.g.,Thepopulationftgivenstatcherish sifolk- roandmeta- a rativ s;ny,y individualstakenheiridentityfromedmany,nyl vbyth .Suchpeopled tlik theseleg ndsantmythicalfiguresob'corrected' r‘re-evalua ed’ —tl stnit r ofthepreciousandhallow dst rylinest yle ntinh rchildhoo . e.g.,Mostfthepopulationgivenstatecannotl s lyide fa yofthprincip lmr objectivesfthepolicystat ’sag nresponsiblefortconservationfhis rya dth preservationofheritage; e.g.,TheCitycouncil’spol cytowardshist ricalpresentationaninter r tationh av lweighte towardsWhite’,‘European’‘mal ’,ilit r stic ,and‘progressivist’o ylin s—sidencfr m acontentanalysisdtexturaldiscontr c iofi smu eumxhibi s. e.g.,In1993thestateconductsaninternalr viewfhisto ic lconservationser i sai heritageint rpretationprogram.Whilstmofi ssta fandmemberspr ferr dl ttlajoch nge toexistingpolicy,herewsharpdivisionsot ekindf‘add tional’servicesprogramt y wouldeachliketse .Thfollowingindingsw rerec rd d:ma v acys r ic s(61%); moreoutreachprograms(47%);orejoint-pr vision/dualuse/facilit torr lw k(32 );m e directprovision(26%);m recafet ria- tylese vicesandprogr m(18%).Altogeth r, exceedinglybr arangeofn w/potentialpolicyandop ratio alimprovem ntsw rsuggested;
